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685. While the Shah and his Minister were thus deluding the British Govern
ment in London with promises which it was already out of their power to
fulfil, M. Naus was engaged in getting removed the last obstacle to the
introduction of the new Tariff, which remained in the shape of the Turko-
Persian treaties of 1823 and 1848, the benefit of which other nations could
claim under the most-favoured-nation clause, and during a visit to Constan
tinople in August 190a he persuaded the Porte to make an agreement in
lieu of all former treaties, by which Turkey and Persia consented to grant
each other the most-favoured-nation treatment in customs matters.
686. In the belief that the tariff was still open to modification, Lord Lans-
downc proposed to the Persian Government to send an expert to Tehran, but
in December 1902 Sir A. Hardinge learnt that the Commercial Convention
with Russia was already signed, and that the tariff was shortly to come into
operation. As a matter of fact, the ratifications of the Russo-Persian Con
vention of November 9th, 1901, were duly exchanged on December 27th, 190a,
and a protocol was signed appointing February 14th, 1903, as the date at which
the new tariffs were to come into force.
687. The danger of this tariff to Great Britain and to India lay not so much
in the increase of duties, injurious to our
SecrotlE., March 1903, Nos. 361*318.
interests, which it established, as in the
possibility which it afforded for almost indefinite taxation of our products in the
future by an impecunious Government living mainly on its revenue from customs,
and looking to the increase of its customs revenues as the only security for the
further borrowings from Russia, which, under the present regime, seem inevitable.
Any fresh agreement with the Russian Government would, therefore, lead to the
imposition of higher duties on goods in which Russian merchants are not interest
ed, and place English and Indian trade at the mercy of a power whose avowed
policy is to hamper it to the point of extinction. Recognising that the Persian
Government was no longer a free agent and would merely be able in future, as
now, to plead vis major in answer to our objections, Sir A. Hardinge proposed,
as the only method of protecting British commerce from still more injurious
treatment hereafter, to recognise the Russo-Persian Convention as a fait accompli,
and to induce Persia to conclude with us a special Convention exactly similar to
that signed with Russia, which would at least protect our Persian trade against
any further increase of duties without our consent. On this proposal the opinion
of His Excellency the Viceroy was that if His Majesty’s Government were
prepared to hold the Persian Government to the spirit of the Grand Vizier’s
undertaking to Lord Lansdowne of 21st August 1902 that the new tariff would
not be concluded without giving the British Government an opportunity of calling
attention to any provisions calculated to inflict special injury upon British trade,
and to demand reparation for violation of this undertaking, then it would be worth
while to hold out for better terms from the Persians. But if His Majesty’s
Government were not prepared to fight the matter, then it was strongly recom
mended that the Convention proposed by Sir A. Hardinge should be accepted.
688. M. Naus opposed the surrender by Persia of her present right to raise
her duties on our imports with the permis
Secret E., August 1903, Nos. 280-313.
sion of Russia, but the Grand Vizier, under
promise of secrecy, adhered to the proposal, and a Convention was signed at
Tehran on February 9th, 1903, four days before the Russo-Persian tariff came into
effect.
688 A. Any detailed account of the new Tariff would be out of place here.. It
is sufficient to say that instead of the single duty of 5 per cent, ad valorem which
was imposed upon imports and exports under article 3 of the Separate Compact
relative to commerce, which was appended to the Treaty of Turkomanchai of
1828, the new Russo-Persian agreement substitutes a complicated system of
specific duties, under which the chief imports and exports in which Russia is
n.ainly interested are treated with relative leniency, while those which chiefly
affect Great Britain and India are severely penalised. Thus, to give a few
examples affecting India j amongst imports, with regard to the Russian article
petroleum, it has been estimated that the new rates effect a reduction of per
cent, on the present tariff, while on tea, practically all of which comes from