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            retailing Muscat dynasty, having rebelled against his father, repaired to the Khan of Klielat
            and sought bin aid in dethroning him. The Khan, wishing to have a friendly power
            possessed of a Naval Force to protect his coast, and foreseeing that Sultan would eventually
            succeed to the Muscat sovereignty, so far volunteered his assistance as to give him in
            perpetuity the town aud port of Gwadcl, the only attached condition being that he should
            always defend the place against the enemies of Klielat. Considering tho unimportance of
            Gwadcl at the time, and the Klmn's inability, from want of ships, to guard it from attack,
            there is no improbability in this story, and several of the facts on which it is founded are
            supported by contemporary Arabian historians. It will doubtless he easy for the present
            Kuan to dispute this statement, or to sot aside the prescriptive right of undisputed possession
            by the successive rulers of Muscat for upwards kof a century; and he may further deem
            himself justified in establishing his claim by force ; but I am at a loss to perceive how 6ucl»
            success would benefit him permanently, or prove of any advantage to the furtherance
            of the Telegraph scheme. Syed Thoweynee would certainly oppose any attempt of the kind,
            and although it is probable that he would lie unable to resist a determined laud attack by the
            Khan's Army, one of his ships of war would suffice to blockade the port aud to cut off
            all communication with the 6ca, thereby stopping effectually all trade aud doing serious
            jnjury to the Khan's inland territories.
               9.  On tho whole, therefore, it appears to me that the influence of our Agent at Klielat
            would be best used in dissuading the Khan from any such enterprise. Ilis abstinence therefrom
            will prevent complications most detrimental to the growing trade of those ports ; will entail on
            himself no damage; and will leave him aud us with a friendly ally at Gwadcl, whose good
            offices may be relied on in any matter wherein British interests arc concerned. 1 found that
            Syed Thoweynee was well aware of the attack which the Khan meditated against Gwadcl
            in 1S57, and he seemed to know, moreover, that the Chief had not relinquished the idea of
            seizing it; hut the Khan is represented as hesilatiug to carry nut his purpose, owing t*» tho
            urgent expostulations of his kinsman, the Jam of Beyla, who is reported to have frequently
            dissuaded him from the undertaking, on the ground that it would be a violation of the promise
            made by his grandfather to Syed Sultan. 1 have been also assured that the Beloochecs at
            Gwadel are quite satisfied with the Muscat rule, for Syed Thowyoncc levies no tax on them ;
            and with a view of feeling ihemselves more safe from an attack by the Khan, they have urged
            His Highness to build a wall round the town, and he has promised to accede to the request as
            soon as possible.
               10.  The country between Gwadel and Punsinee, a distance of eighty miles, belongs to
            Khclat, and the general testimony of the Arabs and Beloochecs, with whom 1 conversed on
            the Biibject at Muscat, agree in tho opinion tint, protected by the vigorous authority of the
            present Khan, the Electric Telegraph would he perfectly safe through that disiriet. An
            equally favourable opiui-n was expressed regarding the feasibility of the scheme b-tueeu
            Punsinee and Sonmeeauee. The int-i mediate line of coast belongs to the Jam of Beyla (or tho
            Jam of the Zidgal as ho is more usually stvled), a Chief who appears to be universally respected
            for his integrity and good government. He is said to be cousin to Khodadad Khan, the Khan
            of Khelat, acknowledging his suzerainty, but being iu reality quite independent of him within
            his own territories.
               11.  I have deemed it superfluous to enter into any details of the country between Bunder
            Abbas and Bush ire. That tract being bond Ji(le Belgian Territory, and the coast being
            inhabited by a civilized population largely engaged iu trade, no serious obstacles to the  success-
            ful establishment of a Hue of telograph can exist there should the Bei>ian Government under­
            take to protect it. I have also purposely omitted auy suggestions regarding stations, for the
            simple reason that I anticipate no difficulty whatever on that score, but the i-elcction must be
            left to the officers who may bo deputed hereafter to survey the route. All the»-e points, how­
           ever, are very secondary to tho important political questions involved in this scheme. Pei&ia is
           extending her conquests eastward, not far north of the projected line, and the Beloochce tubes,
           who once claimed the coast, are gradually losing their independence. Reliable intelligence
           reports her troops to be in force not far from Kej, and it is believed that they will eventually
           invade the territories of the Khan of Khelat. Apart from the more momentous cousiderat ons
           iavolved in tho progress of Persian supremacy in Central Asia, and its bearing on our eastern
           policy, the actual conquests of the Persians outlie line of the projected telegraph route cannot
           bo overlooked in connection with that scheme. If we had to negotiate only with tho Jam of
           Beyla, the Khan of Khelat, tho Beloochce Chiefs on the coast, aud with His Highness Syed
           Thoweynee of Muscat, I feel convinced that, with prudent mauagement, the Electric Telegraph
           might be set up at once from Kurrachcc to Bunder Abbas, and be maintained in perfect security.
           But in view of the predominance lately acquired by Persia in those parts, can wo safely set aside
           her claims to be consulted on tho subjeet, safely, I mean, as regards the projected scheme ?
           Yet if any concession is asked of Persia as respects her lately acquired possession- in Mekran,
           shall we not thereby recognize a right which may be fraught with serious consequences hereafter,
           and thereby also give the Native Chiefs of those districts just cause to regard us as tho allies
           of their hated invaders, instigating them by such a course to thwart the projected s hemo in a
           thousand ways, which no Persian Forco could effectually prevent ? This poiut, as I have already
           observed, is » nc of such delicaoy, that I abstain from diseasing it any further, and shall there­
           fore submit it in the very imperfect form in which it has been stated to the serious eonsidera-
           .tion of the Hon’blo the Governor in Council,
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