Page 360 - Gulf Precis (VII)_Neat

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0. On the extreme west, under a Treaty between Maskat and tho Persians,
the Coast from Uundor Abbas to a point oastwavcl of Capo Jask had been
farmed to the former. Artielo IX of this Treaty specifies :
"Should the Governors of Kars, or the Governors of Kirinnn. on any important occasion
wish to despatch troops towards Cutch or Met ran, or Heluchistan, they shall he treated with
the respect due to Governors, and shall he supplied with provisions, guides and escorts."
7. Remarking upon this Article as suggestive of further meditated encroach­
ment in the direction named, Mr. Badger
provided ror
the passage ot troops through Bunder
Abhas towards MclSSn; Baluchistan, and oven Cutch (Gundava) that is, in a
line towards the Indus which may eventually bo found more practicable than
any more northern route. Tho Persians had already reduced tho Ameer of
Bolaidi, whose territories extended about sixty miles along tho roast, and placed
the province of Gch under tribute. According to credible information
collected at Maskat they had also advanced from Barapur and occupied
Sirbaz, completely routing the Bcloochis. To the south they were reported to be
in force as far*as Nussirabad, having subjugated all the country to the west­
ward, and to bo meditating an attack on Kej, the capital of the Khan of
Khclnt’s Mekran territories; while, on the north they had very lately retaken
the district of Dizzek from Azad Khan, a firm ally of the Dost, and were acting
in concert with tho Jam of Herat and Afzul Khan, who were said to be march­
ing in force on Kandahar. The report oommunicatcd by Major Green respect­
ing this latter movement was confirmed at Maskat by several Belooclii Ckiofs
apparently well acquainted with the course of current events in Mekran and
Baluchistan.
8. Whilst hesitating to attach any serious or immediate political conse­
quences, as regards British interests in the East, to these encroachments of
Persia in Central Asia, Mr. Hadger nevertheless deemed the subject of sufficient
importance to evoke the vigilance of Her Majesty's Government. And as
regards tho proceedings of the same Power in the Persian Gulf, lie thought
that th»*y supplied a strong motive for the adoption on our part of a vigorous
yet discreet policy, such as may tond to conciliate the maritime Arab tribes in
that quarter, and confirm them in their attachment to the British Government.
• (il) Proposed negotiation with Persia and local Chiefs.
9. The Bombay Government addressing the Government of India on the
subject of probable negotiations for a line
No. 93 of 12th July 1801.
of telegraph in these parts, expressed their
opinion that it would be necessary to recognize what Persia actually possessed,
and that the only sound course to pursue in this and all similar relations was,
to deal direct with the Chiefs by permission of the Sovereign Power. This
course, while compromising the rights of neither parfy, wouid enable us to
conciliate both. Persia would take no alarm at a proposal which would involve
a recognition of her actual position, and the object of which would merely ho
that of facilitating the working out in detail of a scheme to which she had
already given her consent: the Chiefs on the Court, on the other hand, would be
satisfied with being, in practice, brought into direct communication with us,
and thus fully assured of the various benefits winch will naturally arise to
them out of the establishment of the proposed Telegraph Line. His Excellency
in Council, therefore, trusted that tho Government of india would procure from
tho Court of Persia, through the Minister at Tehran, the necessary permission
for opening negotiations directly with tho Chiefs.
No. 6198 of 9th Sepleuibor 1861. 10. Tho Government of India replied;
“ Had the sovereignty of Persia over the Mekran coast been throughout bettor established
and more generally acknowledged, the Viceroy in Council would have felt less difficulty in
concurring with the views entertaiued by His Excellency the Governor in Council. But tho
relations between Persia and the Chiefs of the Mekran coast are, oven where based on Treaty
conditions, as in the case of tho Sultau of Muscat, of a dubious character. In others, as in
* 1 havfl borrowed wetioni (ii) and (iv)—(viii) of Chapter II and Chapters IV, V and VI mostly from
Colonel Goldiujid i Memoraudutn-Political A, Juno 1869, No#. 357-358.