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256. On tho 6th March 1900 a telegram was received at the Teheran Lega­
tion from Colonel Mcado, reporting that
Secret K, Juno 1900, Nos. 38—09.
tho Sheikh of Mohammcrah had hoard
that tho Belgian Administrator of Customs was about to take over the Moliam-
mernh Custom-house, and that if ho consented to this step ho would bo in danger
from tho tribesmen. Colonel Mcado was of opinion that tho Sheikh could, if
ho wished, offer an effective resistance to tho Persian Government, and that tho
alternative would bo his departure to his Turkish estates. In either case
troubles would result which would bo detrimental to British interests. Colonel
Meade also drew attention to the possibility of Russiau interference and the
presence of a Bussian warship in tho Gulf.
257. This telegram arrived just as Sir H. M. Durand was leaving Teheran,
but he directed Mr. Spring-Rice to reply to tho effect that ftwe can neither ad•
vise the Sheikh to rebel, nor can we advise the Persian Government to give up
the idea of taking over the Mohammerah Customs, which is a necessary part
of the Customs organisation scheme on ivhich the financial stability of Persia
depends. IVe can, however, advise both parties to accept a compromise, by
which the jjroposed Customs reforms could be carried out without impairing
the Sheikh's ouhoard authority. The Sheikh is no worse off than the Persian
Government itself, ivhich has surrendered its Customs all over Persia to
foreign employes'*
258. On receiving Lord Salisbury’s approval of this telegram, Mr. Spring-
Rice informed both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Sadr-i-Azam, in
tho course of conversation, of the news which had reached him from Moham­
mcrah, and asked if the British officials in the Gulf could he of any assistance
id the matter. It was pointed out that there was no intention of interfering
with tho internal affairs of Persia, but that the Sheikh had been of great ser-
vice to the British merchants in keeping order on the river, and that any dis­
turbance in his district would close the country to our trade. The Sadr-i-Azam
said, in reply, that he was sending an official with presents to explain tho
matter to the Sheikh, and that the Sheikh should receive compensation for any
loss he might incur.
259. Mr. Spring-Rice subsequently called on M. Naus, the Belgian Direc­
tor of tho Customs Administration, and,
Secret E, Juno 1900, Nos. 35-C9 (52).
in compliance with his request, sent to
Colonel Meade a message to bo delivered to the Sheikh, explaining tho nature
of tho intended steps, and informing him that the Shah would send a manager
to confer with him. Colonel Mcado, who had gone to Mohammerah, had two
interviews with the Sheikh, which ho reported by telegram to tho Foreign
Office. Tho Sheikh expressed great anxioty lest a Belgian official should be
sent to take over the customs before the arrival of the Shah’s messenger, and
Colonel Meade hoped that steps would he taken to draw tho attention of the
Persian Government to the danger of taking precipitate action.
260. Mr. Spring-Rice called again on M.Naus, who requested him to send a
telegram in reply, stating that no Belgian
Ibid (No. 63).
official would he sent till the Shah’s
messenger had arrived. Before, however, he had despatched this telegram,
he received a note from M. Naus requesting him to postpone further action in
the matter till he had seen him. The -whole of the next day M. Naus was
engaged with tho Sadr-i-Azam and the Imporial Bank, hut early on the ensu­
ing morning he called, and in the course of a long interview, explained to
Mr. Spring-Rice that, to his regret, the Sadr-i-Azam had decided that no stops
whatever should he taken till the Shah’s return.
261. The fact was, he said, the Shah desired to put an end to tho semi-
independence of the Arab tribes in the
Ibid (Wo. 65).
south, and the Persian Government pre­
ferred “ taking one bite at the 8heikh to two.” If tho Sheikh consented to
tho arrangements proposed, the Persian Government would lose an excellent
pretext for interference. If ho resisted, the Shah’s journey would have to be
postponed. Serious action would he taken on tho Shah’s return, and a gun­
boat would be ordered for uso in tho river, Tho loss to tho oustoms by this
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