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delay would be about 20.000J., which the Government could ill-spare. They
woro, however, decided on this course of action. lie mentioned this in strict
conGdonco, and expressed liis personal regret as well as his thanks for the assist-
anoo offered.
262. He, himself, was anxious for at pacific arrangement, and was per
fectly willing to make every allowance for tho Chiof’s susceptibilities aud
prestige.
263. In consequent conversations with the Sadr-i-Azam and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Spring-Rice pointed out that Her Majesty’s Govern
ment had boon anxious to offer their good offices as they had every reason to wish
success to any moasuro for the reform of Persian financo or administration.
Ho gathered, however, that tho offer was not a very welcome one, nor the sub
ject one of which they woro inclined to bo communicative.
264. Having received a warning from a source well-disposed towards
us that the Customs of Mohammerah was regarded as pledged to tho Russians,
occasion was taken to ask the Mushir-ed-Dowleh what were the facts of the
caso. He admittod after somo hesitation that Mohammerah teas not excluded
from the pledged districts.
265. The opinion of General Schindlor was, however, to the contrary
effect, and when the Bakhtiari Chief, resident in Tehran, was told that the
Customs of Mohammerah would fall under Russian control if the intcrost of
the debt was not paid, he vehemently asserted that this could not, and would
not, he allowed.
266. In bis letter, dated 20th March 1900, Mr. Spring-Rice wrote to Lord
Salisbury
“ As to the Sheikh’s power of resistance, and the communications which have passed be
tween him and Her Majesty’s Minister, I have the
Ibid No. 66.
honour to enclose a memorandum drawn up by
Mr. Ronnie, who has just returned from the south. The Persian authorities are quite confid
ent of their power to expel the Sheikh if they wish, and the Bakhtiari Chief is of the same
opinion. But General Schindler asserts that the Sheikh disposes of a very formidable force,
and doubts whether tho Persians (whom the Arabs detest) will be able to reduce him to sub
mission.
There can be no doubt that it is in tho interest of the general Customs administration that
Mohammerah should not be excepted from the direct control which is to be extended over the
entire Empire, and it would seem in consonance with the general policy of Her Majesty’s
Government to assist the Persian Government in any measure of reform, esp°cially in oue on
which their independence from Russian control immediately depends. On the other hand, the
Sheikh has deserved well of Her Majesty’s Government aud is on friendly terms with our
officials ; but his independence is regarded here as a danger to Porsia, and assistance to him
would be viewed as little less than encouragement to a rebel. It will, therefore, be a matter
of great delicacy to intercede for him. Yet, if serious measures are resorted to, British trade
will evidently suffer, and tho existence of trouble in a district claimed as cvontually pledged to
Russia may be a pretext for sending Cossacks to the spot, or calling fur the help of a Russian
ship.
I would, therefore, submit to Your Lordship that it would be undesirable, for the present,
for mo to allude to the subjeot again to the Persian Government, or for our officials to take any
further steps in the matter, until the question has been carefully considered.
I am assured that a deep-rooted conviction exists in this country that Her Majesty’s Gov
ernment desire to annex the south of Persia, aud are preparing the way by intriguing with the
tribes.
It has been suggested to me that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government in regard to
the Gulf should be explained to the Shah on the ocor.si.-n of bis visit to England, and that an
opportunity should be taken of impressing on Ilis Majesty the very serious nature of the
Mohammerah question.”
267. In January 1901, M. Simais, Director General of Persian Customs
Department at Buskire, proceeded to
Secret E., April 1901, Nci. 109—111.
Mohammerah for the purpose of inter
viewing tho Sheikh in the matter of the assumption by the Persian Governments
of the management of Mohammerah customs. As regards tho proposed
arrangements, Colonel Kemball reported on 9th March 1901:—
“Estimating the total tribute paid by tho Sheikh to the Persian Government to be
60,000 tomans yearly (it u not known what portion of this is derived from the customs as
ft