Page 256 - Arabian Gulf Intellegence
P. 256
214 MUSKAT.
The six pirates were in January 1843 transferred to the
custody
of the Shaikh of Kishm, on the understanding
a. d. 1843.
that a reference having been made to Govern
ment for its decision as to their ultimate disposal, he should restore
them, if called upon to do so. Orders having been received in March
for their being sent to Muskat, to be dealt with as the Imaurn should
think proper, they were brought back to Bassadore, whence (one having
died in the interim) the remaining five were despatched to the care of
Syud Soweynee, Governor of Muskat, by an opportunity which offered
in June, with an intimation expressive of the expectation of Govern
ment that their crimes should be visited with adequate punishment.
The civil war at Bahrein was not viewed with indifference by the
local authorities at Muskat. The total discomfiture of the chief, who
had hitherto so resolutely and successfully frustrated every endeavour of
the Imaum against Bahrein, and the disordered state of its affairs, afforded
the prospect of carrying into effect His Highness’ Jong cherished design
of adding that fertile island to the list of his possessions. Esai bin Tarif,
at heart quite as much the enemy of his present ally Mahomed bin Kha-
leefa, with whom his own interests only have led him to make common
cause, as of his rival Abdoolla bin Ahmed, had (there existed good
grounds for supposing) invited them to make the attempt, and was
prepared to join their standard whenever they did so. These were
responded to only, in the first instance, by supplies of ammunition and
military stores, Syud Soweynee being unwilling to enter upon so exten
sive an expedition without the instructions and authority of his father,
who was still absent at his African possessions. The latter referred
him to the British Government, for whose sentiments he desired that
an application should be made. He subsequently wrote himself to the
Resident, requesting that the reply might be returned in English, and
was informed that the subject had been laid before Government.
The policy of the British Government, though never perfectly
approving, had never hitheTto interfered to interrupt the views of His
Highness: but his own personal absence from the scene of action, and
the incapacity and inexperience of his representative ; the probability
of his giving umbrage to the Wahabees, and thereby endangering the
integrity and independence of his own territories in Oman; and the fair
excuse that would be afforded to the Persian Government for espous
ing the cause of the deposed chief (who had already solicited its
assistance), in the event of his pursuing an opposite line of policy ,
and, finally, the circumstance of the ex-chief having been debarred t e
aid of several of the maritime Shaikhs of Oman, were now important
reasons for recommending the maintenance of a perfect neutra ity on
his part.