Page 477 - Arabian Gulf Intellegence

WAIIABEES. 433
them to recover the places on the sea shore near Musseldom dismem­
bered from Sohar, which would reduce the defence of the country to one
point, the passage across the isthmus. It was important to obtain that
object before the return of Saood from Mecca; and it would give the
Omanees sufficient time to unite and assemble for their general defence,
encourage them to advance to meet the enemy, as they would be
secured from attacks in their rear, whilst Saood’s return might be de­
layed by a feint demonstration of an intention of attacking Bussora;—
the active co-operation of the Arab States could be depended upon, and
would render success certain and easy; but if the spirit of resistance
which had displayed itself was allowed to be stifled by the unresisted
power of the Wahabccs, the trade of the two Gulfs must be annihilated,
and that on the Malabar Coast, Kutch, Sind, and Guzerat exposed to
constant depredations from a desperate and fanatic enemy.
27. The expedition to the Gulf, which was determined upon as well
for the relief of Muskat as for the suppression of the Joasmees, was
conducted with a degree of caution and of forbearance towards the
Wahabee Chief which rendered its results efficacious but for a short
period. Notwithstanding it was indisputable that the Joasmee Arabs
were under the control of Wahabce officers, and compelled to engage
in piratical depredations, “ all operations by land were to be avoided,
otherwise than might be momentarily necessary for the more effectual
destruction of the pirate vessels in their harbours; and in any case
Captain Seton was to be careful to make it in due time fully known to
the Wahabee, and the officers of his Government, that it was our sincere
wish to continue at all times on terms of friendship with him and with
the other States of Arabia (which were all in subjection to the Waha­
bee), desiring only to provide for the security of the general commerce
of the seas, and of the Gulf of Persia in particular, so long and so unjusti­
fiably interrupted by the Joasmees, in breach, also, of a positive treaty
concluded with their chief in 1806:* ; the motives and objects of our
interposition involving no views of aggrandisement on our part, but
being altogether limited to the repression of maritime depredations
(such as is equally condemned by the professors of every religion), and
the just support of our ally the Imaum of Muskat cannot reasonably
i give offence to any other State or Government.”
28. Before the armament sailed from Bombay, the confederacy that
was forming against the Wahabees was brought
a. d. 1809-10.
to some degree of maturity, for we find the
Imaum preparing an expedition oti a large scale, which was to be
* The chief had abandoned the country, disclaiming all countenance to a concern in the
attack of the Sylph cruiser iu 1809, and professing a desire to maintain the treaty in question.
The Joasmees were at this time under Hussein bin Ali, the 'SValiabee vicegerent.