Page 416 - UAE Truncal States_Neat

The Formation of the Federation

ment of the central authorities in certain matters which may be vital
to the Stale as a whole, such as industrialisation or exchange
control? Another dimension in this financial issue is whether the
Federation is a viable State if the main source of its finance does not
belong to the nation as a whole but is controlled entirely by the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
The first dimension reduces to the question of whether he who
pays the piper may call the tune. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi has become
the Federation’s first President for two reasons: because his Emirate
was and is by far the wealthiest and will for the foreseeable future
provide the financial mainstay of the Stale, and because he was and
is a fervent advocate of the Federation, demonstrating even before its
formation his readiness for almost unlimited financial and political
sacrifices on its behalf. Because he is so committed to the Federation
it appeared not unreasonable for him to expect more spontaneous
response to the central government’s authority, much in the way in
which tribal loyalties used to be enhanced by financial incentives.
The fact that this was not the case in a number of vital issues, such as
immigration policy or defence, led to Shaikh Zayid’s threat in 1976
not to accept a further term in office as President. In July 1976 the
seven Rulers did not approve the draft of a permanent constitution
which would have given the federal bodies very much greater
authority and could have committed Dubai to contribute a larger
share than before to the Federation’s revenues. In order not to be seen
to cause the disintegration of the Federation, Shaikh Zayid did
accept a second term in office as President. But the crisis could not
fail to bring about concessions by the individual Rulers and local
authorities which strengthened the federal authorities.
While the federally-minded made little headway towards unifi­
cation of armed forces or immigration policy, the issue of federal
national ownership of the oil was dodged altogether. The Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral Resources continued to act only with respect
to Abu Dhabi’s resources, while Dubai and Sharjah remain to this
day completely autonomous in their petroleum policy. The four
northern Emirates, which in spite of incessant efforts have failed to
become oil producers, question from their side the perpetuation of
Article 23 of the Provisional Constitution which gives each Emirate
the exclusive control over its resources, and they resent the vast
sums of money which Abu Dhabi—although in the name of the
UAE—gives in aid and as a means to secure friends internationally.

389