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22 PERSIAN GULP ADMINISTRATION REPORT
(3) To offer a^Governorship to the Kawam-ul-Mulk and to insist on 1^
departure from 8hiraz.
In the meantime, however, on March. 8th* His Majesty’s Foreign Office
who were previously disinclined to take active measures and anxious to await
the formation of Swedish- gendarmerie, now proposed (as they considered the
situation in Shiraz to be getting worse), to commence negotiations on the
suggested above: they enquired whether the despatch of troops was regarded as
an essential preliminary and intimated that, in view of the opinion expressed
by His Majesty’s Minister that the despatch of troops was unnecessary as far as
negotiations were concerned, they were disposed to deprecate the step.
The Resident replied on the 13th March to the Government of India
expressing the view that the despatch of troops was a sine qua non to the suc
cessful outcome of the negotiations, more particularly in view of the time that
had elapsed since the attack on Mr. Smart without any overt action on our part.
He considered that there was no reason to think that the situation had got
worse, and again urged that if His Majesty’s 'Government decided to take no
action to secure reparation, an announcement on the subject should be given
the fullest publicity in order that we might, at all events, derive some benefit
from this further indication of our friendly forbearance
The Government of India, on March 23rd, intimated to His Majesty’s
Government that they considered that the Resident should be authorised with
out further delay to negotiate with the headmen on the road, but considered
despatch of troops to Basidu unnecessary, in view of the improvement ia the
attitude of the Persian Government: they urged that continued pressure should
be brought to bear on the Persian Government in order to effect the punish
ment of those responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart. They expresssed the
view that our cavalry escorts at Shiraz and Ispahan constituted the one weak
spot in our position, and must, until greater security prevailed on the roads,
remain where they were.
On April 2nd, His Majesty’s Government intimated to His Majesty’s
Minister that, after careful consideration of the whole situation, the following
decision had been arrived at:—
(1) Those persons who are well known locally to have been guilty of
attack on Mr. Smart and party, must be handed over for punish
ment to the Persian Government. On this requirement being
fulfilled His Majesty’s Government would at once withdraw the
detachment at Bu shire, and if the tribal chiefs and headmen showed
for at least two months a friendly feeling and peaceful attitude
and if road outrages do not recur, cavalry at Ispahan and Shiraz
would also be withdrawn.
(2) The Persian Government must undertake, before troops are finally
.
withdrawn, to support the Swedish Officers to the best of their
ability.
(3) They must also induce the Najaf clergy and extremists at Tehran to
telegraph to the tribes as proposed above.
(4) A new Governor-General must be sent as soon as possible to Para.
(6) The K a warn to he provided with a good post elsewhere.
(6) Occupation of Basidu not considered necessary.
(7) No public announcement of pur policy held to be advisable, beyond
intimation to the Persian Government
A note embodying conditions (1) to (4) was presented to the Persian
Government on April 14th. A claim for the compensation for the attack on
Mr. Smart aggregating £4,744* had already been presented to the Persian
Government on March 4ththe Persian Government promised to pay this
gum, but affected to believe that they had been given to understand that this
payment released them from any further obligation to His Majesty’s Govern-
• Thie am wa* tn*d® up u follow* .—For the wounding of Mr. Snort £1,000; for 4 man killed or
•Sng end 3 men likely to be permanent!j dlablcd £3<X»e*ch; for 7 men leu Mrioulj wounded £100
Tame of loct property £044.