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FOB THE YEAR 1012. 28
nt in tho matter of the punishment of the guilty parties, which was not the
pie
A few days after this decision was reached, the Persian Government learned
0f the contemplated negotiations with the chiefs; they at once protested
strongly that the Central Government’s prestige and authority would be
imaged thereby: they were told informally in reply that the scheme would
not have been carried into execution without the concurrence and approval of
tlic Persian Government, and that the latter’s prestige would have been care*
fully safeguarded.
On 19th June His Majesty’s Foreign Office telegraphed that there was no
jooiu for hope that the culprits would be handed over to the Persian Govern
ment within the time limit specified in the British note of April 14th, and
enquired whether it was politic to continue insisting on the surrender of cul
prits : in reply to a request for views on this point the Resident and also His
Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, urged the vital necessity of securing the punishment
of the guilty parties and'His Majesty’s Minister in his reply to His Majesty’s
Foreign Office likewise expressed the opinion that this condition could not
advisedly be dispensed with.
The Government of India expressed the view, on July 12th, that the idea
of the indefinite retention of the cavalry under present conditions and of
construction of barracks must be abandoned, that cavalry must be retained until
October, and that, meanwhile, action might possibly be taken by the new
Governor-General such as would enable us without loss of face to withdraw
the troops in October, failing this, the question of the line to be adopted by
us would have to be further considered early in September.
In commenting on the above, on August 16th, His Majestey’s Foreign
Office concurred with the views of the Government of India that the regiment
should be withdrawn in October; and as regards the possibility of re-estab
lishing British prestige intimated that His Majesty’s Government were prepared
to take any measures that the Government of India or the local British offi
cials could suggest which would not entail an expedition into the interior
of the country.
In the meanwhile, a force of gendarmerie was badly defeated, on August
4th, a few miles from Shiraz, and the situation in and around that town ap
peared to be getting worse.
His Majesty’s Consul, on learning of the above mentioned decision, of
His Majesty’s Foreign Office, urged, on August 15th, that the cavalry regi
ment should not be withdrawn until reparation had been obtained, questioned
the possibility of withdrawing the regiment without sending up more troops
to cover the movement, and suggested instead, that we should support the local
Government with small loans, under supervision, and by a regular force say
1,500 strong, gradually to he raised by British officers, the Swedish officers
being considered destitute oi the necessary qualifications. He added, however,
that an essential preliminary to such action would be to rehabilitate our in
fluence by securing reparation, sufficiently to give weight to our support of
the local Government and to enable our officers to form a local force. In thia
connection he proposed the despatch of additional troops from India- and then
to proceed to secure reparation or force, withdrawing as soon as this object had
been obtained He anticipated that such action would assist the local Govern
ment whose difficulties, on the other hand, would be greatly increased were
°ur cavalry to be withdrawn before the tribes who had attacked them had
been called to account. On 20th August His Majesty’s Minister telegraphed
that Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh, who was about to leave Tehran, for .Pars did not
^hh the troops to be withdrawn from Shiraz, but had suggested that the
Ispahan detachment should be moved to Shiraz, as a first step towards with-
jbWal, so soon as those responsible for the outrages of December last had
surrendered, a step which he was convinced of his ability to secure, parti
cularly if Muhammad Aii Khan, the chief offender, was not to be reckoned-
88 a guilty party, and if execution of culprits was not to he insisted on: • he
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