Page 36 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920

26 PERSIAN GULP ADMINISTRATION REPORT
ulv&fulk was necessarily hostile to the gendarmerie, and every action the .Gove*
nor took, such as the arrest of the Kalantar, was invested by them with a sink
ter intention.
The Muwaggar* ed-Dowleh on the other hand, knowing that the Darya
was in the Governor-General’s entourage was inclined to be suspicious, and
without reason, of various steps taken' by the Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh and of n*
instigation of the Darya Begi.
Matters were not improved by the appearance at Bushire, os interpreter n
the Swedish officers, of one “ Muhammad Rcza ” Ycneziani, of Shiraz, an Italic
Jew and pervert to Islam; and, almost simultaneously, of Muntasir-ul-Mulk
command of a detachment of the Malayir regiment. The latter had giVei
trouble at Ispahan in the past, and it was freely stated that he had been de*.
patched specifically with a view to helping various other intriguers to render
the Governor’s position untenable.
It will be seen therefore that at the close of the year that there was 60rne
reason to apprehend that the Swedish officers through ignorance and inexperience
might, if they would not listen to the friendly counsel of His Majesty’s Consul-
General, become involved in the chronic intrigues which are characteristic <rf
Persian administration, a circumstance which could not fail to react unfavour-
ably upon their effectiveness and utility.
When the question of withdrawing the troops at Shiraz was mooted, in
Financial assistance given by His Majesty's August, His Majesty’s Consul, whilst dep-
Governmcnt to the administration of Pars. recating SUCh action, had Suggested as
item9 of a constructive policy, the raising of a small regular force under British
officers, and the reversion to a suggestion he had put forward in May for the
support of the local Government by small loans to be expended under "supervi­
sion ; but he expressed the view that the essential preliminary to such a policy
would be rehabilitation of our influence by securing reparation sufficient to give
weight to the local Government. His Majesty’s Minister concurred in tins
proposal, and suggested that were the Governor-General to be given from £2,000
to £ 3,000 a month, he could create a valuable military force, which would
enable him to maintain order : so that by the end of a year he might hope to have
established himself firmly in the province and to be in a position to collect all
the revenue necessary for the wants of his Administration. It was suggested,
that the money might be paid through the Treasurer-General to his Agent in
Shiraz and handed to the Governor in concert with the British Consul.
As a matter of fact, an advance of £10,000 had already been made by us
to the Persian Government to assist the Administration of Pars * Some £5,000
of this was spent locally chiefly in meeting the arrears of pay due to the troops*,
of the balance £2,000 was paid to induce the Governor-General to leave Tehran;
the remainder 600n disappeared on “administrative measures” without having
any but the most transitory effect on the situation.
His Majesty*s Minister was also authorized to advance sums up to £ 6,000
a month for the expenses of the Governor-General’s administration out of the
£16,000 which remained from the British moieties of the joint advance of
£50,000 which, had been made by the two Powers in August; the expenditure
to be carefully controlled with a view to ensure it going to the right objects
A Belgian Treasury official was appointed to Shiraz by Monsieur Mornard to
control the revenue and expenditure of the province, but had not reached he
post by the end of the year, whilst, pending the preparation of a regular budget
by the Governor-General, no part of the £15,000 had been actually paid ov#
to him up to the end of the year.
It is to be feared, however, that little if any good, or lasting result can l*
achieved by such fragmentary measures unless they form pari of the construe*
tive policy on a more ambitious scale than it has hitherto been considered feasible
by His Maiesty*s Government to adopt: financial support alone is insufficien
when capable and honest men qualified to take effective advantage of it arc n°
to be found.

• Or, as the “ Time* ” correspondent naivelj described it u to enable the Deputy«OoTcn» r of
(Kawam), to take rotaTuto j measarei against Bovrlet-cd-DoV.eh'i tribesmen".

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