Page 34 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920

24 PERSIAN GULP ADMINISTRATION REPORT
said, however, that he could not guarantee the safe passage of the troops to th
coast, at all events until we had obtained reparation.
On August 21st, the Government of India made the following proposals •
(1) A Consular guard of 12 cavalry and 1 British offioer and. 60 8eI>0y,
to be left at Shiraz.
(2) A mixed brigade of 1 squadron cavalry, 4 battalions infants
1 Battery mountain artillery, one company Sappers and Mine*
and details to be despatched from Bushire to Kazerun plai^!
force not to be used for punishment of tribes, but for defensive
purposes.
On August 31st, the Secretary of State replied that he was advised that
this force was dangerously small even for protective purposes and that, to
inflict adequate punishment, a larger force wa9 needed. His Majesty's
Minister in commenting on the above proposals deprecated any military action
for the present and suggested that the new Governor-General, in whom he
had some confidence, should be financed by His Majesty’s Government to
enable him to establish himself firmly in the province. As regards the pro­
posed military operations, he expressed the view that an expedition, if sent
should be punitive and should, if undertaken at all, take the form of an oc­
cupation of the Kazerun valley until such time as the gendarmerie could
take over the road and the abuses of “ Rahdari” had been regulated.
On September 27th, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of
State to the following effect:—
({} Idea of punitive expedition had been intentionally discarded, as,
though it would have been intelligible had it been despatched
in the spring, it would after such a lapse of time be difficult
to explain.
(ii) It was admitted that suspicion of the tribes and even of the Persian
Government would be aroused, that withdrawal of regiment
could only be effected with difficulty, and that it would only
be by firm determination that trend of events towards action
could be resisted.
(Hi) In view of the opinion of His Majesty’s Government and of
His Majesty’s Minister that it would only be possible to effect
withdrawal by a force of sufficient strength to punish assailants
seriously and to follow them up for the purpose, Government
of India had been led to reconsider the position, as in their
opinion such action must necessarily result in prolonged guerilla
warfare and very probably the ultimate occupation of southern
Persia.
(ic) They deprecated any action likely to precipitate occupation, though
it was a matter for consideration whether it might not be forced
on us in future.
The only alternative appeared to be to retain the regiment at Shiraz for
the present, and that the Governor-General should he suppoted by us as far
as possible, though they could not be sanguine of his success.
This course was finally decided on, and on October 5th the Ispahan
squadron left for Shiraz, arriving there on October 22nd, without incident.
Up to the end of the year no steps had been taken by the Governor-
General to secure the arrest or surrender of those responsible • for the attack
on Mr. 8m&rt'i party.
So much stress has been laid both in communications to the Persian
Government, in Parliament and in gene­
Swedish Gendarmerie.
ral correspondence on the importance at'
• Tbs ftfWwin* U • Ibt of thorn arid by Hahammad Kfaaa, Kaihkoli, ia eonrenation with Mr. H. G. CW*
to he the chief culprits, and general! j admitted u each by common repost s—
First aod foraaoet: Muhammad JJ& Khan himself.
Kal Fends*.
KdKbsAB.
Msr Muhammad Bshrsrdi (for ths attack on the Kotal).
All Mohammad, KomarijL '