Page 29 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920
P. 29
FOR THE YEAR 1912. 19
por some time after the attack on Mr. Smart, the significance of the inci
dent, and its probable effect on the local
Landing of troopa at Boablre.
situation at Shiraz and on the safety of the
detachments of Indian troops there, was not clear. It was deemed necessary as a
precautionary measure, and in anticipation of any further military measures that
Light be indicated to land a small force at Bushire, thus freeing Hiw Majesty’s
sliips from the guarding that port. One hundred and sixty men of the 79th Carnatic
Infantry were accordingly landed on December 30th and after this 100 men on the
2nd January, a naval brigade of 200 men were held in readiness to land if necessity
arose, and 200 hired mules were retained at Bushire for use as transport should
it app°ar that immediate action was imperatively required. It soon became
clear, however, that this was not the case and the hired mules were dismissed,
but tbo infantry retained at Bushirc. Accommodation for this detachment' was
fortunately obtained almost at once, the fiqp block of buildings erected by the
late Malik-ut-Tujjar at Reskirc being leased at a very reasonable figure by the
Residency for their use. The 79th Carnatic Infantry were relieved in Novem
ber by a detachment of the 2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry,
■without occasioning any remark or incident, indeed there is reason to think
that the Governor of the Gulf Ports has been inwardly much relieved and
fortified by their presence, and it was popularly believed that had they not
been stationed here, the Tangistani tribesmen of Zair Khadhar would have made
the arrest of Abdur Rasul, Kalantar, au excuse for coming in force to the
Islaud, a course which would almost certainly have resulted in further distur
bances, such as occurred in 1909 and 1910.
A squadron of the Central India Horse remained at Bushire throughout
the year.
The Government of India suggested the despatch of a battalion of Infantry
to Bushire as a preliminary measure, with
Proposals for obtaining reparation.
a Anew to seizing the Customs which
should be retained, the surplus receipts over and above what was due for the
loan being kept as a contribution towards the claim to be made upon the
Persian Government; they also indicated the necessity for a blockade of the
coast to prevent the tribes from obtaining supplies of ammunition, the latter
step was taken by the Naval Commandcr-in-Chief early in January: the occupa
tion of Bandar Abbas was also suggested.
As regards punitive measures against the offending tribes, the Government
of India considered that action in this direction would be extremely difficult and
hazardous, but they intimated that should the local situation at Shiraz render
the relief of the troops at Shiraz and Ispahan imperative, they might find
themselves compelled to send a force of 6,000 men to bring away the troops
now in the interior, together with the members of the Shiraz Consulate
and any British subjects who might desire to avail themselves of the opportu
nity in order to leave Shiraz. They were opposed on military and general
grounds to the despatch via Lingah or Bandar Abbas of a battery and
een suggested by His Majesty’s Acting
battalion of Infantry which had bee
Consul, Shiraz, and supported by His. Majesty’s Minister, but proposed to hold
Maicstv’s Minister, but proposed to hold
Bushirc until the Persian Government had given satisfactory redress.
In connection with thc’above proposals, the India Office pointed out that
the despatch of troops to Shiraz would have to he postponed until the force
there was actually in danger, and that the occupation of Bushire would not
necessarily afford a sufficient lever to move the Persian Government to
efficient action. It was further pointed out that at Shiraz, Ispahan and Yezd
there were Consular Representatives and subjects of other Powers, inoluding
Bussia, and that in the event of our withdrawal we must contemplate the contin
gency that steps for their protection would he taken by Russia, the appearance
of whose troops in the neutral sphere could not fail greatly to affect the policy
of the Anglo-Russian Convention as regards Persia.
The Russian Government had in fact already adumbrated the possibility
of their having to strengthen their Ispahan escort in order to protect Russian
oaravans passing from Ispahan to Shiraz and Tehran respectively. Hie Persian
Government simultaneously urged His Majesty’s Government not to take any
drastic measures but to leave them to deal effectively with the situation