Page 30 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920

20 PERSIAN GULF ADMINISTRATION REPORT

themselves, alleging that heavy casualties had already becn^inflicted on Persian
•* by the improper U66 of Maxim guns ” on the occasion of the attack on
Smart, and further, that those responsible had been pursued and arrested* by
Muhammad Ali Khan, Kashkuli, statements for which there was not the
smallest foundation.
His Majesty’s Minister expressed himself very reluctant to contemplate
the evacuation of Fare, though iu view of the many objections to which the
alternative courses were open, he would have been in favour of such a course
were it not for the size of the force which would be necessary in order to effect
this. It would seem regrettable, he said, that so great a Military display should
be undertaken merely to result in the abandonment of our interests m Pars.
His Majesty’s Acting Consul at Shiraz, however, at first anticipated very
serious disorders in the spring and, whilst unable to prophesy whether this would
result in an attack on troops and Europeans in Shiraz, considered that such a
contingency could not advisedly be ignored.
On 16th January, His Majesty’s Foreign Office telegraphed their decision
to evacuate Shiraz and requested the Government of India to submit proposal*
as to the composition and size of the force necessary to effect this after
consultation with His Majesty’s Minister. The evacuation of Ispahan and
Tezd was also contemplated, but was decided to be unnecessary.
On 23rd January, the Government of India replied urging reconsideration
of the question of withdrawal, it was pointed out that the situation had eased
considerably since the alternative of evacuation was adumbrated and that the
Shiraz detachment could, should need arise, return via Ispahan and Ahwaz.
The Government of India were inclined to think that the seriousness of the
situation and the probability of dangerous developments had been overestimated
by local officcis, and expressed the belief that danger could be averted by timely
negotiations with the tribes concerned and by other measures uhich they
considered should first be attempted. Doubts were expressed as to the wisdom
of withdrawing our Consulate, as such a step would create a vacuum of which
others were likely to take advantage, to our detriment.
The Government of India stated that not less than a war division less one
brigade would be required to effect a withdrawal from Shiraz, and that its
despatch and possible retention would have an injurious effect in Muhammadan
opinion and would afford a fresh pretext for Russian action in the,Novth.
They strongly recommended that negotiations he opened (as had already
been suggested by them on January 11th) with tribal chiefs for the preservation
of order on the ro&d. In pursuance of this scheme a regiment of Native
Infantary would be sent to Bushirc. and it would ’ then he explained to the
chiefs concerned that His Majesty’s Government were extremely anxious to
avoid intervention, that they had no designs against any of them ; that such
outrages obviously could not be tolerated ; but that, before resorting to extensive
operations, His Majesty's Government offered to them the opportunity to give ns
satisfaction for the recent outrage and to enter into a direct compact with us
for the maintenance of security on the road. It was contemplated to subsidise
the Chiefs concerned, in return for which they should keep up guards on a
regular roster .and regular pay, a Special Assistant to the Resident being appoint­
ed to supervise the arrangements; it was also suggested that in order to asso­
ciate the Persian Government with these measures, Swedish Officers would b
employed to assist the British officer in supervising the road levies.
Before negotiations could commence, however, it was considered necessaij
that the Khan of Borasjun should he eliminated or punished, and a strict
blockade of the Persian littoral maintained.
Aa regards the vindication of our position vis-a-vis the Persian Government,
it was suggested that steps should be taken to exact from the Persian Govern­
ment reparation for the recent incidents and the cost of the measures prop0^
As a preliminary step in this direction, the Government of India suggest#
that a Regiment of Infantry and a Mountain Battery should be located m tn
British enclosure at Basidu: their presence, it was considered, was desiraD
in connection with measures being taken for the suppression of the Ar