Page 13 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

similar ethnic, regional, or professional ties. All of these organizations exist in a state of semi-illegitimacy
and in turn, exercise power with a subtle interplay with other (nominally illegitimate) authorities of the
peasantry playfully referred to as the lao bai xing.

Hidden authorities are crucial in the maintenance of order in China, as is around the world.

Applying this approach to the South China Sea disputes, it is hard to see how the sea grabs is solely a
product of Beijing policy to effectively unilaterally abrogate the UNCLOS treaty obligations of the PRC.
Local business interests, like the fishermen and other commercial interests, right to including the ship builders
and their suppliers, that is benefitting from the naval buildup with business they would otherwise not have;
and, the regional PLAN/PLA, the “Coast Guard” and “Fisheries Patrol” in the area are all major makers and
executers of policy.
What about the criminal or semi-illicit enterprises engaged in piracy, extortion, smuggling, or illegal
immigration that have extensive networks throughout Southeast Asia that no doubt play a key role in the
disputes?

Or the competing grabs by all the formal and informal claimants?

Into this mix of competing authorities, demands on the Beijing regime of China to honor their UNCLOS treaty
obligations and push back against Chinese activities like PLA/PLAN land reclamation and the building of
bases on disputed territories have been at best, ineffective in moderating Chinese behavior at the local level.

Rare and occasional FONOPs by primarily US vessels and aircraft have had no impact and perhaps, made
things worse by demonstrating the impotence of the US and allies in this policy area in establishing and
maintaining a rules based order.

What this calls for is a different approach than the present strategy of parlee with Beijing as if Beijing is the
sole and major problem for the South China Sea.

In order to develop a more nuanced and effective policy, the US and allies need to develop a far more
granular and detailed picture of the non-Beijing actors in the policy area, whether it be the local branches of
the PLA/PLAN, Coast Guard, Fisheries Patrol, or other units in the area, their ties to military owned or
controlled businesses, and non-state actors.

Ideally, such expansion of the knowledgebase shall encompass actors from every other state in the area. But
to do so will require a different skill set and allocation of intelligence resources.

Armed with better knowledge and information, the US will be able to forge a policy that cans precision
target incentives and sanctions to support a UNCLOS compliant regime to all parties that matter in these
disputes.

And not just Beijing.

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