Page 8 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

What makes the Chinese case unique and different is that this is a far more difficult decision to make that
have more likely than not, eluded them ever since the first Xia class SSBN was built in the 1970s.

While it is not publically known whether any or what portion of PRC nuclear forces are on standby for
immediate launch, what is known is that there has been no attempt to establish a regular SSBN patrol outside
of SCS despite having at least 4 operational Jin class SSBNs as of 2016.

That begs the question as to whether or not the Jin class SSBN building initiative originates from Beijing
controlled Central Military Commission and the Rocket Force, or is it a local Southern Theater Command (STC)
Initiative?

A parallel question will be who are the drivers behind the development and deployment of JL-2 submarine
launched ballistic missiles.
If the current iteration of Jin Class SSBNs is a STC initiative, it is entirely understandable why the Beijing
based regime will be extremely reluctant to allow nuclear weapons to be deployed by the STC fleet — no
matter how impressive they may appear.

The decision to devolve control would empower the STC, a group that is ethnically, linguistically, and
politically distinct from the Central-China/Northern/ Shanghainese cliques that have dominated PRC politics
since the establishment of the PRC.

Transfer of the command and control of a sea based nuclear arsenal to the SSBNs is potentially as much a
threat to the Beijing regime as it is to other nations.

From this perspective, the STC’s initiative in building the Jin Class Submarines in the absence, or at least,
ahead of the decision to permit them access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles can be seen as a
strategy to force Beijing’s hand — by showing how compelling it is to equip the STC with ICBMs and nuclear
weapons.

If this is the motive, it would then follow that the STC will be motivated to be aggressive in pushing for
the elements to “fall into place” that makes their gambit successful.

To enumerate, the elements will include undisputed control of SCS including exclusion of the US and other
Navies, subjugation of the Philippines, and ultimately, breakout into the Second Island Chain.

This interpretation will lead to the conclusion that appeasement and compromise with the PRC, especially via a
Beijing that is limited in their control over the Southern Theater Command, is for all practical purposes,
impossible short of unconditional acceptance of the PRC’s terms for the South China Sea.

FROM COUNTER-PIRACY TO PIRACY: THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE
CHINESE NAVY

By Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird

The Chinese Navy has come out into the big world as a counter-piracy force.
For example, the PLAN has been part of the anti-piracy operations off of the waters of Somalia.

And in 2014, the PLAN did an exercise with the US Navy with regard to counter-piracy.

Second Line of Defense

Page 7