Page 6 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

operate according to the cold logic of defense planners and geopolitical factors. Recall Stalin’s USSR had no
concerns about going to war with neutral Finland to secure the flanks of Leningrad before WWII.

What do these factors tell us about the intent of the PRC?

A bathymetric map of the South China Sea shows that much of the western region is shallow, with the deep
basin directly northwest of the Philippines at the Manila trench. Topographically, the geography is highly
variable with many undersea mountains, valleys and islands that place a premium on detailed knowledge of
the terrain for submarines to operate in the area.

It is a great area for a small displacement, long endurance, quiet, stealthy submarine to operate, with fresh
water mixing with salt water, tides, thermoclines, and other dynamic features favor the knowledgeable
operator.

If the purpose of PRC dominating the SCS is military-strategic-geopolitical in origin, it leads to two
explanations: South China Sea as a potential “Boomer Bastion” where PRC’s fleet of Nuclear Ballistic Missile
submarines can operate safely under the protection of PLAN surface and PLAAF air cover providing that
enemy submarines and ASW units are kept at bay.

The other, not mutually exclusive explanation is that control of the deep basin in the eastern SCS is critical to
access the only viable exit to the Philippine Sea, and then Open Ocean for not just SSBNs, but the entire PLAN
force including submarines.

Access to the open sea will allow PLAN units, particularly submarines, to play havoc with allied
shipping and add an entirely different element to the PRC’s A2/AD strategy.

The area from which the USN Drone was seized reveal that it is in the area defined by the Manila trench that
is deep and a good pathway for submarine operations with access to the entire basin of the eastern SCS. It
would be next to impossible for the PLAN to secure the SCS as a boomer bastion without securing the Manila
trench almost all the way to the Philippine shoreline regardless of international boundaries or UNCLOS.

Second Line of Defense

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