Page 7 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

From this perspective, the violation of international law by the PLAN operating in the Philippine EEZ is a
relatively minor consideration compared to the strategic imperative of securing the SCS basin.

The PRC will likely demand the Philippines acquiesce to this in the event of a conflict with the US and allies.
President Xi’s New Year’s speech’s uncompromising stance on sovereignty and maritime interests reflected this
view.

The greater concern, however, is the gateway to the South China Sea: The Luzon Strait.
Absent the seizure of Taiwan in the near future or the surrender of the Philippines, control of the Luzon Strait
will be the only way for the PRC to access the Pacific Ocean beyond the first island chain. There are no other
viable exits to the South or West of SCS that do not involve tighter, more easily guarded choke points. But in
order to do so, the PRC will have to control at least some, if not all of the islands guarding the Luzon Strait
and Balintang Channel.

Batanes and Babuyan Islands are the next objective of the PRC’s strategy to dominate the SCS.

Seizure of territory that is indisputably part of the Philippines will be costly for the PRC. Construction of bases
on uninhabited islands in the SCS by reclamation is one thing, but the takeover of populated islands of the
Philippines indisputably put the PRC into the category of aggressor akin to the seizure of the Crimea.

The question is what are the interests and motives that will tip the PRC’s calculation to make this move.

The fact is, PRC have so far, gotten away with every move they made in the SCS.

The PRC have invested considerable resources to build a fleet of at least 5 Jin class SSBNs and numerous
SSNs and SSKs. Such a fleet, fully armed and operated on war patrols, likely constitute a double digit
percentage of the PLAN’s entire budget, and considerably more for the Southern Theater Command (STC).

To date, the fleet has rarely sailed on patrol, and it is not known that they have ever sailed armed with live
nuclear weapons.

Utilizing the SSBNs on a bona fide war patrol will require many assumptions about the PRC nuclear posture to
be altered. For example, the regime’s assertion that PRC nuclear warheads are stored separately from the
launchers is practically unfeasible for an SSBN out on war patrol. Likewise, an armed SSBN lowers the hurdles
to altering a “no first use” policy claimed by the PRC.

Contrast this with implementing a nuclear first strike strategy with land based ballistic missile forces, where
warheads can be distributed and mounted just prior to intended use. With SSBNs, it is not possible to not
deploy warheads not mounted missiles on war patrol.

That leads to the option of arming just prior to sailing: SSBNs used either defensively in a “surge” deployment
to a boomer bastion, or for a Pearl Harbor style first strike or the western style deterrent patrols.

SSBNs on war patrol will require some form of devolution of launch authority to the officers and crew of the
vessel to a far greater extent than a land based nuclear force. Secure communications with a submerged
SSBN is an issue that is critical for a second strike posture unless one were to devolve control to the same
extent as UK did with their nuclear deterrent’s “Letter of Last Resort”.

Devolution of launch authority for nuclear weapons to a small group of well-trained officers and crew is never
taken lightly in every country that have done so.

Page 6