Page 11 - Russia OUTLOOK 2023
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mass and polls show that the majority of those protesting were protesting
                                      against the Kremlin’s extra-judicial treatment of him rather than supporting
                                      Navalny per se. The protests petered out and a third in the spring failed to
                                      draw significant numbers.

                                      The West also baulked at imposing crushing sanctions on Russia to punish the
                                      Kremlin for his arrest, although the complaints were loud and public. Brussels
                                      has become shy of forming policy around individual cases after it tied aid to
                                      Ukraine to the release of opposition firebrand Yulia Tymoshenko, after then
                                      president Viktor Yanukovych jailed her on trumped-up charges. When she was
                                      finally released after Yanukovych fled the country following the EuroMaidan
                                      revolution in 2014 Tymoshenko was well received by the crowd, but had clearly
                                      lost her authority and much of her popularity.

                                      Without an effective opposition in Russia the chances of Putin being
                                      ousted by some sort of colour revolution are very low.

                                      Nevertheless, Putin has taken considerable risks by starting a war in Ukraine.
                                      Shortly after the invasion, hundreds of thousands of young Russians, many of
                                      them in the IT sector, fled the country to visa-free neighbours like Turkey and
                                      Georgia.

                                      Putin took an even bigger gamble in September with a partial mobilisation that
                                      started on September 21. The decision to conscript 300,000 men in effect
                                      broke Putin’s famous social contract with the people: don’t interfere with
                                      politics and we won’t interfere with your daily lives.

                                      However, as the number of those conscripted is less than 1% of the population
                                      and was concentrated in some of the poorest regions of Russia’s interior such
                                      as Dagestan, the lives of the bulk of Russians, who mostly live in the European
                                      parts of the country, did remain unaffected; Putin hedged his bet.

                                      Falling popularity and looming presidential elections in 2024 were other
                                      reasons for the crackdown that started in 2021. Putin’s popularity has been
                                      falling slowly as society slowly politically matures. Putin’s personal approval
                                      ratings remain high in the mid 60s for most of the years following a spike to
                                      80% after the annexation of the Crimea, but his trust rating is sinking slowly.

                                      There is now a whole generation that was born after the fall of the Soviet
                                      Union, which had its 30 birthday in December last year, and that were children
                                      in the hell of the 90s. This more worldly generation are relatively comfortable
                                      and starting to demand more from the government in terms of services,
                                      opportunity and wanting more say in government.

                                      Analysts argue that the start of the fall in Putin’s popularity began in
                                      2018 when pension retirement ages were raised, which was also a blow to
                                      his classic Putin-era social contract. A high level of support for Putin in the
                                      2018 presidential elections was mistakenly interpreted by the authorities as
                                      real political credit, rather than indifference and mostly symbolic trust.

                                      While purely political opposition remains stunted, protests on quality of life
                                      issues can become large and vocal, which the Kremlin is struggling to contain.
                                      It is clear that this dissent will eventually transform into large-scale popular


               11 Russia OUTLOOK 2022                                          www.intellinews.com
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