Page 14 - Russia OUTLOOK 2023

putting increasing pressure on the EU government’s to find a resolution. There
have been only a few mass “end the war” protests already, but the danger is
that these will grow. In particular, the worst of the energy crisis in the winter of
2022/23 seems to have been avoided, but it is also becoming increasingly
clear that there will be a new and even more severe energy crisis in the winter
of 2023/24 that Europe is very keen to avoid.

A long but unfruitful winter campaign may soften everyone up for an attempt at
renewed talks, but the situation remains very unpredictable.

One of the biggest changes in Russia-watching the conflict has brought is that
Putin has changed from a slow and careful player, who spends years in his
preparation, to someone who has gone at every stage of the conflict to
extremes that no one anticipated, starting with the act of a full-scale invasion
right at the start of the war. He has become impossible to second-guess and
prudence means all the options – including the use of nuclear weapons –
remain on the table.

At home, Putin’s time is limited too. While he retains support for the war, the
domestic polls show that support will wane over time, as Russia is suffering
from the same cost-of-living crisis. While 86% of Russians were happy with the
annexation of Crimea – and remain happy – a Levada Center poll in the
autumn shows that only 25% approve of the military action in Donbas.
Russians are uncomfortable with Russian troops in a territory they clearly
consider to be Ukrainian.

At the end of 2018, 56% of respondents to a Levada Center survey said there
was a significant military threat from other countries. This year, the fear of a
world war has increased dramatically, reaching a solid second place in a
Levada Center list of the top issues causing Russians to worry. The other fears
that have risen in parallel with that of war are those of an increasingly harsh
political regime, mass repression and arbitrary rule: the authoritarianism of the
Russian political regime has not gone unnoticed.

War is the business of young people and conscripts. But 66% of Russians
aged between 18 and 24 – the post-Soviet and post-Yeltsin generation – have
a positive or very positive attitude toward Ukraine, according to Levada.

14 Russia OUTLOOK 2022 www.intellinews.com