Page 5 - FSUOGM Week 45 2022
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FSUOGM                                       COMMENTARY                                            FSUOGM










       Source: IEA.




































                         to divert more oil exports to China, but pipe-  political in nature. Kazakhstan has adopted a
                         line constraints could make it difficult to ramp  largely neutral stance in the Ukrainian conflict,
                         up shipments in the short term. Some volumes  despite being a member of the Russian-led Col-
                         could be put on trains and delivered from the  lective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
                         oil-rich Atyrau region to Uzbekistan and China.  It has complied with sanctions against Rus-
                           “Work is now underway in all these areas  sia, and sought to distance itself from Russia’s
                         to expand and increase the potential for oil  aggressive actions.
                         exports,” Smailov said.                First, a storm inflicted some damage to port
                           President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated his  infrastructure, and later, Russia announced it
                         desire to ramp up oil shipments to China back in  had to close the terminal after World War II ordi-
                         2019, but to date, the pipelines linking the two  nance had been discovered in its vicinity. And in
                         countries have mostly managed Russian oil tran-  July, a Russian court threatened to shut the CPC
                         sit volumes under long-term contracts. In con-  conduit down completely, citing environmental
                         trast, they only handle 20,000 bpd of Kazakh oil,  violations. That decision was ultimately reversed,
                         and even at their height in 2012, shipments only  but analysts have linked it to heightened ten-
                         amounted to 240,000 bpd. The issue is that many  sions between Moscow and Astana over the lat-
                         of the Kazakh oilfields that previously exported  ter’s lack of support for the Russian position on
                         their production eastwards are now mature,  Ukraine.
                         whereas the country’s main growth projects   In particular, Moscow may be irked by
                         such as Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan are  Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s
                         all geared to sending their oil westwards. What  announcement on July 4 that his country was
                         is more, there is only limited upside in Chinese  prepared to send more oil to Europe to support
                         demand for Kazakh oil, and Tengizchevroil and  its energy security, at a time when the EU is pre-
                         other international consortia would sooner send  paring to enforce an embargo on Russian oil
                         their oil westwards, because doing so will fetch a  imports later this year.
                         higher export price.                   Kazakhstan’s desire to diversify its export
                                                              routes is rational, but will be a significant under-
                         CPC disruptions                      taking that will take years to have a significant
                         Deliveries of Kazakh oil via the CPC pipeline  impact. And even if its reliance on the CPC sys-
                         to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk  tem is reduced to 50% or even 40% of its total oil
                         have seen several disruptions this year, since  exports, that still gives Moscow significant lev-
                         Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine, and  erage over Kazakhstan’s biggest source of export
                         at least some of these incidents appear to be  revenues. ™



       Week 45   14•November•2022               www. NEWSBASE .com                                              P5
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