Page 74 - Freedom in the world_Neat

Cronyism

Administrative appointments based on loyalty or patronage rather than merit are likely to
produce inept officials, unresponsive governance, and public resentment. It is for precisely
this reason that the framers of the U.S. Constitution gave the Senate an “advice and
consent” role in the appointment process. As Alexander Hamilton explained
in Federalist #76, advice and consent is “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in
the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity [emphasis added].” Despite this and other checks, cronyism has infected federal,
state, and local government throughout the country’s history.
Ironically, one of the first accusations of cronyism was directed at President George
Washington for appointing Hamilton, his trusted political adviser and former lieutenant
colonel, as secretary of the treasury. While Hamilton quickly proved to be a shrewd and
adept treasury secretary, there is no shortage in American history of executive appointees
who showed themselves to be far less competent. Appointees of President Andrew
Jackson were particularly notorious. Upon winning the 1828 presidential election, Jackson
filled the executive branch with his friends and supporters, many of whom were untrained
for the positions they were given and indifferent to the work they were assigned. He
reasoned that rotation in the federal bureaucracy was “democratic” and argued that his
electoral victory gave him a mandate to hand out jobs, a claim subsequently expressed
with the phrase, “To the victor go the spoils.”6
Under the spoils system, which was adopted by later presidents, appointments were
routinely and openly given out as rewards for political support. One consequence of the
system was excessive turnover, as each president replaced the hires of the previous
administration with his own people. This resulted in a lack of institutional memory and
experience, which exacerbated bureaucratic malaise and inefficiency. After half a century of
increasingly ineffective administration, the federal government gradually replaced
patronage with the merit system. In 1883, the Pendleton Act created an independent
commission for bureaucratic oversight, instituted standards for hiring, and provided job
security for employees brought up under the new system. Subsequent federal laws and
other developments limited patronage still further, and by the turn of the century, cronyism
was largely restricted to the most senior administrative positions. However, at the state
and local levels, patronage remained commonplace until the 1940s, when it slowly
disappeared with the collapse of most the country’s political machines.

Despite institutional checks such as Senate approval of executive appointments and the
gradual demise of the spoils system, presidents have continued to nominate loyal friends
and advisers to important posts, regardless of merit. In fact, the use of the term “cronyism”
to describe the practice was popularized by the press in reference to the administration of
President Harry S. Truman.7 The term stuck as subsequent presidents gave the press
abundant occasions to use it. President John F. Kennedy made his brother the attorney
general and appointed Robert McNamara, whose background was in business
administration, as secretary of defense. President Jimmy Carter named his old friend Bert
Lance director of the Office of Management and Budget despite his questionable business
practices as chairman of Calhoun National Bank. (Lance resigned after a Senate

Page 74 of 168