Page 102 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY
P. 102

Media in Retreat  87



              seats reserved for the military, which Team Seven’s bill set at fifty-five, and the use
              of a district system of representation, replacing the previous proportional system.
                                                                                         3
              Other unresolved questions included what percentage of seats each party must win
              to qualify for the next election cycle and whether civil servants should be active in
              political parties.
                            4
                   On television and in print, coverage of this stage mirrored debates among legislators
              fairly closely, focusing on the few issues preoccupying insiders. Complicating the media’s
              role, however, was pressure to cover those outside the process, some of whom rejected
              the existing parameters altogether. Most visibly, thousands of students rallied outside
              parliament to protest the upcoming legislative session that would cement the current
              leaders’ claim to power and their right to determine the rules governing the transition.
                   As the special session approached, actors fell into roughly two camps, labeled
              “insiders” versus “outsiders.”   The outsiders were pushing for major reform, led by
                                        5
              students but supported by civil society groups, some retired military, and (with fluctu-
              ating enthusiasm) opposition politicians. The group of insiders resisting such reform
              consisted of regime allies, military stakeholders, and much of the incumbent parlia-
              ment, all coalescing within the ruling Golkar party.   Members of the media could be
                                                           6
              found across this spectrum, but all outlets faced pressure to “cover both sides,” a man-
              tra repeated frequently in this period. Relative to the more independent print press,
              television stations, all owned by either the government or Suharto’s family and cronies,
              were more sympathetic toward the Habibie regime, the military, and their supporters.
                   In reporting student efforts to stop the session that would cede this control to the
              old guard, media coverage, on balance, neither condemned nor endorsed the students’
              objectives. As the parliamentary session drew closer, however, tensions in Jakarta grew,
              and the impending showdown put news outlets in an increasingly difficult position.
                  The protests, inspired by belief that the current government was illegitimate, pre-
              sented two major predicaments for news outlets. The first involved negotiating the
              physical risks in covering events on the ground. With tanks rolling through Jakarta’s
              streets and military-recruited civilians (Pam Swakarsa) attacking students, reporting
              on the demonstrations meant covering confrontations between protesters and secu-
              rity forces and facing the possibility of direct assaults by soldiers and police.
                                                                                 7
                   The second predicament was more complex. Covering the protests meant cover-
              ing the questions they raised: Was the session legitimate, and would the transition
              be compromised irredeemably if current legislators decided the rules for new elec-
              tions? Much of the student movement objected to the incumbents’ involvement. At
              this early stage, even strictly factual reporting on the students tended to validate their
              agenda—including demands that Habibie resign, parliament be dissolved, and genuine
              reformers with no vested interests take over. The students were pushing for conditions
              more conducive to effective democratic reform, aiming to inhibit, rather than facilitate,
              incumbent manipulation of the process. A supportive media might have demonstrated
              equal passion through editorials challenging the parliament’s legitimacy or spotlight-
              ing student leaders’ demands for a new interim government. Avoiding such coverage
              risked endorsing a biased process.
                   Yet encouraging the students’ idealism also carried risks, notably that of sanction-
              ing an extraconstitutional resolution to their impasse with the state. The students’
              preferred way forward was to establish a “reform council” to replace serving legisla-
              tors.   As the session approached, however, a very different extraconstitutional out-
                  8
              come seemed more likely. By November, Jakarta again looked like a city under martial
              law. Wire barricades reappeared, and soldiers returned to posts along the main roads.
              Thousands of Pam Swakarsa—young men bussed in by the military and armed with
   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107