Page 98 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Reformasi 83

Tempo and Dë TAK produced some of the most forceful reports pushing the lim-
its of government tolerance, especially Tempo ’s October 1998 cover story on mili-
tary involvement in the rapes of ethnic Chinese women and Dë TAK ’s November
1998 investigation revealing high-level orchestration of the “ninja” murder spree in
East Java. In presenting carefully researched findings, Tempo and Dë TAK pulled no
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punches, almost daring officials, particularly military leaders, to react. Both publica-
tions recast a troubling narrative of past events, presenting evidence that seemingly
spontaneous violence that had marred the democratic transition was elite-directed
and designed to make Indonesia seem a cauldron of interethnic conflict requiring a

return to authoritarian rule. Together, Tempo and Dë TAK helped prevent reversal by
discrediting the military’s claims to be a defender of order and casting suspicion on
attempts to use intergroup violence to slow reforms.
Despite the element of provocation in both reports and the disturbing implica-
tions of their revelations, neither produced an open confrontation with the state.
Therefore, while both publications helped broaden the range of permissible speech
beyond what had been conceivable under Suharto, the reports did little to institu-
tionalize these widened boundaries, and neither report triggered government back-
lash or became a major scandal. In short, these hard-hitting investigative reports
momentarily expanded the de facto bounds of permissible speech, but in the absence
of any confrontation, did not formalize these gains or force accountability on state
actors.
Just a few months later, Panji Masyarakat released its wiretap report, which accom-

plished what Tempo and Dë TAK had not, sparking a serious scandal that soon became a
confrontation between the government and the print press community. Although the
case never reached the courts, it produced new clarity in the battle for media reform,
strengthening support among fellow journalists and sympathetic legislators for for-
mal recognition of specific rights, later codified in the 1999 Press Law.
The Panji case did not impose legal accountability on actors, but it did impose
political accountability. The controversy exposed the new regime’s continuity with the
old, revealing Habibie’s collusion with his attorney general to protect the deposed dic-
tator and dispelling his image as a reformer, which had given legitimacy to his plans
for a second term. It also inspired other media outlets to pursue related revelations
and question Habibie’s fitness as a leader right when Golkar was floating potential
presidential candidates for the next election, with Habibie at the top of the list. In
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sum, the furor threw the ruling party off balance and put Habibie, its best hope for
retaining power, on the defensive.
Critics of Panji were correct that the wiretap story was neither investigative jour-
nalism nor even news. But its impact showed the importance of political scandal, even
without the investigative reporting valued by media professionals and observers.
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Scandal commands sustained public attention by raising rather than answering ques-
tions, creating narrative tension, and inviting nonproprietary follow-up coverage by
competing media outlets that can produce new revelations, multiplying the impact of
the original story.
Though little more than a transcript, the Panji report produced a series of reactions
that extended the life of the original story and amplified damage to the legitimacy of
Habibie’s continuation of the Suharto regime. At a delicate moment in Indonesia’s
democratic transition, scandal served a function of central importance by breaking
up collusive pacts suddenly made visible by the exposure of Habibie’s telephone con-
versations. Media-driven scandal thus checked a recurring inclination in democratic