Page 17 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY
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2    Introduction



              pelted with stones.   At some point during their struggle for survival under Suharto,
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              members of the press had lost their nerve and, in turn, had taught this fear to the
              Indonesian people—perpetuating, consciously or not, the power of the regime.
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                   Now, after so many years of accommodating New Order dictates, Luwarso said
              he was not surprised that many in both media and government feared that removing
              restraints would lead to chaos. This was natural, he said, just as it is natural for one
              who has been in the dark for a long time to be afraid of the light. But if the mentality
              of the nation’s leaders did not change, and if the press itself did not demand com-
              prehensive legal reforms, “this era animated by the spirit of reform will become an
              absurd repetition of the past.”
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                   The views expressed in this forum offer a snapshot of the challenges the Indo-
              nesian media would face during the country’s transition to democracy, revealing the
              burden of Indonesia’s authoritarian past as well as the promise of its democratic
              future. As eyewitnesses to the nation’s turbulent history, many of these journalists
              had already seen the overthrow of an earlier dictatorship give way to Suharto’s thirty
              years of authoritarian rule, thus lending gravity to Luwarso’s warning that the current
              spirit of reform could be “an absurd repetition of the past.” Suharto’s New Order had
              lasted two full generations by embedding itself in constitution, law, and bureaucracy,
              while inserting itself into the language, media, and mentality of ordinary citizens and
              educated elites, journalists included. The pervasiveness of authoritarian values within
              Indonesian society, moreover, meant that democratic reform would require not only
              regime change but also a transformation of the country’s political culture—thus lend-
              ing particular significance to the work of the media.


                Global Context
                   Though their focus was Indonesia, these journalists were addressing the chief
              problem facing similar democratic transitions worldwide: an inherent tendency to
              revert to authoritarian rule. Over the past quarter century, as crowds have toppled
              dozens of dictatorial regimes from Manila to Berlin, from Warsaw to Cairo, we have
              learned a simple lesson: democratic uprisings are relatively easy, almost common-
              place, but successful transitions to enduring democracies are diffi  cult and rare.
                   The moment of regime change sparks tremendous hope among both participants
              and international observers who anticipate the emergence of a more open, democratic
              society. Yet once a dictator has fallen, the most difficult question remains: How will the
              newly democratizing nation avoid reversing course, reverting to authoritarian solu-
              tions for the daunting problems brought by the transition? In Eastern Europe, central
              Asia, and much of the Middle East, this question has gained increasing salience as
              one democratic transition after another has given way to renewed authoritarian rule.
              Indeed, the tendency toward reversal is evident in any environment where the condi-
              tions that enabled authoritarianism are still in place. In Indonesia’s transition, such
              conditions included judicial corruption, electoral fraud, a politicized military, elite
              rent seeking, and executive machinations to retain power. Rather than fleeing into
              exile, moreover, Suharto ceded power to a handpicked successor and retired to his
              luxurious compound in Central Jakarta to enjoy his grandchildren, his pet tiger, and
              access to an estimated $40 billion in accrued assets.
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                   Though tainted by the regime’s corruption, Suharto’s political machine had not
              lost power. Instead, with his loyal protégé at the helm, Suharto’s long-ruling Golkar
              party retained control of both the executive and the legislature, providing a ready path
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