Page 20 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Understanding Democratic Consolidation 5

to what the political theorist Adam Przeworski has described as the institutionaliza-
tion of uncertainty—a process that serves as both a force for democratization and a
critical deterrent to reversal. In most societal contexts, the word “uncertainty” car-
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ries a host of negative connotations. In Indonesia, for decades Suharto’s relentless
campaign against suspected Communists created a climate of fearful uncertainty
among ordinary people ever vulnerable to charges of subversion. Throughout the
New Order, the regime itself faced what Andreas Schedler calls the “twin uncer-
tainty” of authoritarian rule—the “institutional insecurity” all autocrats face in
maintaining power and “informational uncertainty” exacerbated by the repression
of civil liberties. In Suharto’s last years, uncertainty over who would succeed him
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hung like a cloud over much public discourse. Following Przeworski, my analysis
treats uncertainty not as a general state or a type of absence but as a central element
in ruled-based, yet open, democratic contestation that yields outcomes unknowable
in advance.
At the start of democratization, myriad changes introduce far more uncertainty
into the political arena than could have been tolerated under authoritarianism. The
emancipation of the public sphere exposes everyone—reformers as well as the old
guard—to new forms of criticism. The democratic process itself, for all its promises
of fairness and inclusion, offers no guarantees that outcomes will satisfy all partici-
pants. In the face of democratization’s heightened uncertainty, even those committed
to reform in principle may lose the courage to allow democratic outcomes in practice.
The challenge for reformers in any postauthoritarian society is managing the insecu-
rity felt by those with the power to derail the transition without allowing reform itself
to founder.
Przeworski addresses this problem by arguing that democratization should be
understood as the institutionalization of continuous conflicts and, simultaneously,
“the process of institutionalizing uncertainty” inherent in democratic contestation.
He compares this uncertainty to the certainty that characterizes authoritarian rule, in
which some groups (often the military) have the power to manipulate the resolution
of conflicts to protect their interests. While those outside the ruling circle may face
considerable uncertainty, he continues, those close to the regime “have a high degree
of control . . . in the sense that they are not forced to accept undesirable outcomes.”
In a democracy, by contrast, “no group is able to intervene when outcomes of conflicts
violate their self-perceived interests.” Democracy, in sum, is a form of governance
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that subjects all players to uncertainty.
Paradoxically, what lends stability to democracy’s continuous churn of contesta-
tion is that outcomes of individual contests are always, to some degree, indetermi-
nate. “In a democracy,” Przeworski explains, “no one can win for once and for all: even
if successful at one time, victors immediately face the prospect of having to struggle
in the future.” By the same logic, this indeterminacy also guarantees that no defeat
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is ever final and there will be a chance to play again.
Under authoritarianism, there is a strikingly symmetrical inversion of these
principles. Indeed, authoritarianism is generally marked by an obsessive pursuit of
security through predetermined outcomes—whether in elections, the distribution of
government contracts, or court cases. Once established, authoritarian regimes survive
by affording this freedom from uncertainty to collaborating elites. In addition, as long
as a regime can control the outcomes of most contests, there is little reason to main-
tain the mechanisms of indeterminacy that promise future open rounds. Only when
an authoritarian grip weakens and a country’s political situation is in flux does the