Page 24 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Understanding Democratic Consolidation 9

competing propaganda and fostering fears of once-and-for-all victories that will pre-
clude future competition, thereby reducing faith in the indeterminacy of democratic
contestation. But to the extent that the media, on balance, give voice to all competi-
tors, they help maintain uncertainty over which group will prevail in the end—a state
essential, in Przeworski’s model, to democratization before and during the start of
offi cial campaigns.
During this trial phase, the media play a supplemental role in institutionalizing
the uncertainty of democratic elections when imposing transparency on the electoral
process, whether through a daily drumbeat of campaign reporting, critical coverage
of decision-making, or investigations into electoral fraud. Such scrutiny discourages
fraud but also maintains the focus on fairness that all players must sustain to prevent
a return to the distorted outcomes of authoritarianism.
In Indonesia, the trial phase included the first post-Suharto elections of June 1999,
when the country faced its most critical challenges in warding off reversion to fixed
outcomes. Wary of setting off clashes and still inhibited by taboos against reporting
on religion, race, ethnicity, or class, the majority of media, as described in chapters
4 to 6 , avoided a slide into sectarian agendas, even during the violent interreligious
conflict that erupted in the eastern islands. Moreover, in election coverage of the same
period, a surprisingly wide range of opposition voices was able to gain media atten-
tion, an outcome that also helped level the playing field for competitive contestation.
Yet from rule writing through tabulation, the performance of Indonesia’s media
in imposing scrutiny on the parliamentary elections was decidedly mixed—at times
aggressively promoting fairness and transparency, while at other times compromised
by partisan biases and fears of inciting violence. In their compromises, the media
responded to ruling-party machinations and opposition complacency in ways that,
if we apply Przeworski’s model, left the country poised for reversal via a return to
rigged elections orchestrated by colluding elites. Surprisingly, however, this threat-
ened reversal was later halted, in effect, by the same media’s collective pursuit of a
campaign finance scandal that finally broke the ruling party’s grip on power, derailing
its maneuvers to keep Suharto’s protégé, B. J. Habibie, in the presidency.

Democratic Consolidation
The media can play an equally critical role in the final consolidation phase. Fol-

lowing Przeworski, this phase involves (1) the normalization of regular, open-ended
contestation that produces meaningful shifts in the balance of power, (2) strengthen-
ing faith that there will be future fair chances to compete, and (3) development of a
political culture that resists a return to predetermined outcomes.
Reversals that block consolidation often begin not with the restoration of the old
dictator but with the emergence of a pseudodemocratic regime with an indefinite lien
on power—a trend extending from Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus to Abdel Fat-
tah el-Sisi in Egypt, the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan,
Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, and Hun Sen in Cambodia. A recurring dynamic in such
reversal is the formation of an ad hoc coalition of old and new actors around a party
and leader who together manipulate democratic forms for a protracted hold on power,
producing collusive pacts and engineered outcomes in elections as well as in sec-
ondary contests for government contracts, favorable court rulings, and advantageous
economic regulations. Competitive media can play a key role in disrupting collusive
coalitions, even late in the transition, by imposing scrutiny on actors and providing a