Page 173 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

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scandal and partisan conflict, though often divisive, can also deepen democracy’s hold
simply by normalizing its perpetual state of contestation. At a minimum, constant
exposure to the idea of politics as a contest helps reinforce the values associated with
open contests—most critically, the necessity of unfixed outcomes and fair play. But
over time, contest frames and the regular showcasing of scandal can also accomplish
a more fundamental change by making rigged contestation seem unnatural, a viola-
tion of peoples’ individual values and, ideally, the values of a broader national culture.
In Indonesia, the media’s embrace of a watchdog role and shift to the regular air-
ing of political conflict were changes essentially incompatible with, even subversive
of, the integralist doctrine of relations between state and society that it replaced. More
broadly, in any emerging democracy, the media’s reinforcement of public demand for
open contestation and transparency not only helps ward off reversal but is, at many
levels, antithetical to the return of authoritarianism.
In the relentless interplay between democracy and collusion, between transpar-
ency and stasis, scandals and the alliances between media and the public that amplify
them are possibly a weak tool. But in systems compromised by endemic collusion
and intractable corruption, they remain one of the only tools available. If the inher-
ent inclination of democratization is toward reversal, then the tendency of the media,
and democracy itself, to pit people against each other may be the best defense. As the
Indonesian case indicates, by serving as both a public watchdog and, perhaps coun-
terintuitively, a platform for intraelite conflict, partisan vendetta and political scandal,
the news media can serve as a country’s front line and, possibly, last defense against
democratic reversal. The airing of scandals and a larger watchdog role may not be
a cure-all, but media failure to play this role, and thereby impose transparency, can
facilitate the return of authoritarian rule.
Once democratic procedures consolidate, however, all parties in the process
can play more conventional roles. The routinization of democracy, its rituals and
rules, tends over time to reduce the need for heroic interventions by all players,
including the media, thus obviating the more positive role of political scandal. More
conventional scandal emerges almost endlessly from its eternal sources of sex and
money. But grande scandale d’État should slowly disappear, arising only when forces
of reversal threaten radical change that will effectively rig the system and block the
circulation of contending parties. At such moments, scandal once again can serve a
critical function.
The media’s centrality in the process of consolidation makes them vulnerable to
attack by atavistic forces. Conversely, overt attacks on the media can become a potent
symbol for resistance to the return of autocratic rule, inspiring public protests to
discourage further abuses or force an autocratic leader out of power. Defense of free
speech can become powerfully symbolic for antiauthoritarian forces, inspiring further
struggles for democratic consolidation. Actions to control or intimidate the Indone-
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sian media have, since Suharto’s fall, provoked backlash—often sparked by a flood of
condemnation from news outlets themselves.
From the perspective of journalism itself, the lingering idealism of an antiauthori-
tarian struggle, particularly when shared by working journalists, also promotes the
ideal of a critical distance from power holders. Much of Indonesia’s media community,
like many Philippine reporters during the post-Marcos period, cut their teeth on the
political drama of overthrowing an autocratic regime while immersed in prodemo-
cracy rhetoric. Within this community, watchdog journalism, and the investigative
reporting associated with it, are valued for more than their profit potential. Journalists