Page 174 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Media and Civil Society 159

who have fought to rid a country of a corrupt dictatorship are less likely to let the logic
of commercial profit be the sole arbiter of value. And even when commercial news
outlets stop funding investigative journalism, societies emerging from authoritarian-
ism tend to have dedicated individuals who establish nonprofit programs, funded by
both domestic and international donors, to help the country maintain high-quality
journalism—organizations like the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, or
in Jakarta, the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information.
Even after a decade of postauthoritarian publishing success, Tempo ’s chief editor,
Bambang Harymurti, was critical of readers who placed too much faith in a commer-
cial model of journalism to ensure their continued access to independent reporting.
Since such journalism is not, he said, free, as Americans assume water should be,
both strong sales and support from nonprofit organizations, including watchdog
groups, are critical in a news outlet’s adherence to high professional standards. But
he also emphasized the importance of Tempo ’s economic independence, in contrast
to the compromises necessary for outlets owned by major conglomerates.
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The central role of the media is necessitated by another unstated aspect of demo-
cratic transitions: leaders in emerging democracies almost inevitably disappoint. Indo-
nesia has so far weathered profound disillusion with all five post-Suharto presidencies.
But beneath that visible failing, the system of checks and balances changed, quite
fundamentally, with the country’s rejection of Pancasila democracy and its embrace of
a liberal democracy, including a free media, with all its flaws and contentiousness. As
Tempo founder Goenawan Mohamad once suggested, this better democracy we all keep
hoping for may not exist. In reality, perhaps the best we can hope for is a rule-based
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game that does not promise good governance but facilitates the circulation of leaders
who aspire to good governance and are held accountable by a mix of the best and the
worst in human nature.

Comparisons among the democratic transitions in Indonesia and nations in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America return us to the question raised at the outset: How does
democratic consolidation, or democracy itself, become self-perpetuating? For democ-
racy advocates, the fi ndings from this study are likely to be both discouraging and
heartening.
One point these cases highlight is that consolidation does not proceed solely
from the good intentions of political actors, whether journalists, politicians,
business leaders, or foreign powers. In an ideal world, the media would perform
their watchdog functions as an objective tribune of the fourth estate, identifying
problems for solution by responsible elected leaders and informing civil society
groups. These groups would, in turn, pressure leaders to fulfill their obligations
to the democratic process, thereby allowing the free flow of political contestation.
In reality, media organizations are owned by actors with conflicts of interest, jour-
nalists face competing pressures, and politicians are frequently compromised or cor-
rupt. Yet in Indonesia and the comparable transitions discussed above, civic-minded
journalists made use of self-serving sources often pursuing un-civic-minded agendas,
including partisan maneuvering, political ambition, and personal vendetta. In each
context, moreover, intraelite conflict and intermedia competition were critical forces
in compelling news outlets to air information damaging to those in power, overcom-
ing caution and efforts at suppression.
In any democracy, the recurring pull of collusion can, if unchecked, move toward
oligarchy, autocracy, even authoritarianism. Among societies transitioning from