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Origins of Media Controls 25

promoting freedom of the press. Article 4 guaranteed that the national press would
not be subject to censorship or other forms of “muzzling,” and Article 8 stated that
publications did not need a license (Surat Izin Terbit, SIT) to publish. Article 5 identi-
fied freedom of the press as a basic human right. However, the law contained multiple
provisions contradicting these three articles while leaving in place the Dutch lèse
majesté and “hate-sowing” articles prohibiting speech that might insult the president
or provoke contempt toward the government.
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The most controversial provision was Article 13, requiring that all publications
obtain a Press Publication Enterprise Permit (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers,
SIUPP). The regime declared that this requirement was distinct from the Sukarno-era
SIT and therefore not in conflict with Article 8. Yet the SIUPP was more effective as a
control mechanism than the content-oriented SIT it replaced, because of the rewards
it offered cooperative publications and potential sanctions for noncooperation.
According to the minister of information, General Ali Murtopo, a primary func-
tion of the new SIUPP was to allow the government to block “irresponsible ele-
ments” from entering the media market, including “adventurers in press publications
that can hamper the growth of a healthy national press.” Restricting the number of
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publications, the argument went, would prevent the entry of too many players into
an ostensibly limited market, thereby safeguarding the viability of smaller papers and
magazines already struggling to survive. This advantaged existing publications of all
sizes by shielding them from new competition, thereby turning the licenses into a
lucrative rent, benefiting their owners and reducing incentives to oppose licensing.
Nevertheless, there was little security in owning a SIUPP. If the government wanted
to silence a publication, the same reasoning that protected its market position could
also be used to revoke its SIUPP. By reward and potential sanction, the licensing
system created a corrupt bargain that would induce media collaboration for the next
two decades.

Inculcation of Self-Censorship
With these mechanisms in place, 1980s news outlets faced constant threats of
bans, while individual journalists and editors could be fired or thrown in jail for

reports that caused offense. Yet New Order media control was noteworthy not for

its reliance on physical threats or legal penalties but for its effective imposition of
self-censorship, a phenomenon Ashadi Siregar described as “almost a disease from
which no one is immune.” Schwarz attributes this success to the regime’s empha-
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sis on preventative rather than punitive measures in policing the political arena.
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While Malari’s most visible repercussion was the closure of twelve publications, the
National Press Council’s action three years later was more significant in fostering

habitual self-censorship. The council also determined that journalists were to culti-
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vate “positive interaction” among the press, state, and society.
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Yasuo Hanazaki argues that to survive under the New Order, “publishers and edi-
tors were forced to accept the positive interaction concept.” Yet, as in any system of
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control, legitimacy was key to maintaining long-term compliance. In Indonesia’s state
propaganda, the concept of positive interaction acquired a level of legitimacy among
public and media far higher than it might have had with external policing alone.
Though dismantling regulatory controls was a priority for media reformers before and
after Suharto’s fall, the legitimacy of the positive-interaction doctrine would be the
more critical legacy to overcome in establishing a new political culture.