Page 35 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

20 Chapter 1

“between fluid, self-serving factionalism and rigid ideological polarisation.” Even
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after the 1955 election, widely regarded as free and fair, faith in the parliamentary
system was faltering. As the economy deteriorated, public tolerance for the unpredict-
ability of the democratic process declined.
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The extent of liberal democracy’s “failure” in Indonesia during the 1950s is still
a matter of debate. Whether elites abandoned democracy because it had failed or it
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failed because elites saw their interests better served by authoritarianism, Sukarno
and then Suharto cultivated the impression that liberal democracy had been a disas-
ter—in part to preempt calls for its return and in part to justify suppression of demo-
cratic rights, including freedom of speech.
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Rise of the New Order
In tandem with growing repression, Indonesia’s economy fell into disarray under

Sukarno. The country reeled from soaring inflation, and food shortages were imminent;
international tensions increased as the president nationalized foreign fi rms, rejected
US aid, and provoked a confrontation with Malaysia. Concurrently, the Communist
movement, now more closely allied with Sukarno, pushed hard for land reform, rais-
ing tensions with Muslims and the military, and pressured artists and journalists to
adhere to the guidelines of its People’s Cultural Institute. Strained by these confl icts,
President Sukarno’s political coalition became increasingly untenable. In a fi nal bid
for stability in 1963, parliament elected him president for life.
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In 1965, an alleged Communist coup and a military countercoup set in motion
events that effectively stripped Sukarno of power and allowed the little-known Gen-
eral Suharto to seize control and launch his New Order. Suharto’s subsequent crack-
down on what he called a “counterrevolutionary movement” set off a brutal, army-led
purge of suspected Communists that left up to a million dead. “In terms of numbers
killed,” the CIA reported, “the anti-PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] massacres in
Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.”
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Thus, Suharto’s regime rose to power on a wave of terror that left an indelible
mark on the nation’s consciousness, creating a formidable legacy for future democracy
advocates to overcome. Promotion of regime propaganda by surviving media and the
absence of public debate on the killings deepened their impact. As the regime held
public trials of suspected Communists, Suharto asserted his version of events, arguing
that liberal democracy—with its contentious pluralism, partisan press, and confron-
tational politics—had produced the deep divisions responsible for the 1965–66 mas-
sacre. With this portrayal shaping the country’s collective memory, Suharto recast the
bloody military-led campaign that brought him to power as a spontaneous eruption of
mass violence. This reconstruction reinforced a larger, two-pronged point: Indone-
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sia’s short period of democracy had led to the societal disintegration of the 1960s, and
strict political controls, including restrictions on speech, were necessary to prevent
the recurrence of violence.

Early Political Journalism
President Suharto began his reign in the spirit of reform, liberating the print press
from controls imposed by his predecessor. Over the next decade, however, he would
employ and expand Sukarno’s entire arsenal. The resulting apparatus restricted media
outlets through a web of laws and regulations. Increasing control over ownership,