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Origins of Media Controls 17

( musyawarah ) leading to a consensus ( mufakat ) articulated by a wise leader—was cen-
tral to this imagined past.
9
Three days later, in a riveting address to the assembly, Sukarno made his own
contribution to Indonesian political theory with his formulation of the Pancasila, a
doctrine that would become the defining principle of the Indonesian state. Its five
“pillars” were (1) belief in one supreme God, (2) justice and civility among peoples,
(3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy through deliberation and consensus among
representatives, and (5) social justice for all. With deliberations deadlocked, Sukar-
10
no’s Pancasila appealed to all factions, encompassing and subordinating their compet-
ing visions of the state. The word “integralism” never entered the constitution, and
the five pillars did not necessarily preordain the rise of any particular political system.
But over time the Pancasila doctrine came to be seen, in the words of Adam Schwarz,
as “synonymous with and justification for an integralist view of the state”—ultimately
serving as the ideological foundation of Suharto’s authoritarian order.
11
How did Sukarno’s diffuse doctrine, seemingly compatible with a working democ-
racy, later justify integralist views and facilitate authoritarianism? And how did it
legitimate the accretion of controls that stunted the development of a democratic
media? The answer lies partly in the third pillar’s focus on “unity,” a term easily
invoked to justify suppression of dissent. But the regime also reinterpreted Pancasila’s
fourth pillar to further the concentration of power by focusing overwhelmingly on
consensus. While the pillar itself seems to promise an inclusive and egalitarian form
of democracy—mandating mutual deliberation to reach unanimous consensus—in
Suharto’s Pancasila democracy, the ideal of musyawarah untuk mufakat was replaced in
practice by a premium on closure, with consensus redefined as acquiescence rather
than agreement.
Articles within the 1945 constitution also stipulated that decisions be made
through consensus-oriented mutual deliberation—more specifically, through consul-
tation between the head of state, envisioned in these debates as a “just king” (Ratu
Adil), and members of a quasilegislative body representing all sectors of society. Sig-
nificantly, the framers named this supreme body the People’s Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), underlining its advisory character in ways
that predicted the limited role it would later play.
The more proximate reason that this plenary parliament and one of its two cham-
bers, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), became
rubber stamps for executive policy rather than constituting an independent legisla-
ture is that the 1945 constitution lacked provisions for the separation of powers. It
instead stipulated that different branches of the national government would share
responsibilities and engage in mutual support and consultation, miming the imagined
cooperation of Indonesia’s village councils. In practice, this fluid sharing of functions,
particularly through provisions empowering the president to legislate, led to unilat-
eral decision-making and executive concentration of power.
Though Supomo’s vision, emphasizing consensus and repudiation of individual
rights, had strong proponents in the assembly, several framers expressed concern over
its potential to justify the abuse of power. Notably, the future vice president Moham-
mad Hatta, backed by Muhammad Yamin, fought for provisions protecting civil rights,
particularly freedom of speech. But both Sukarno and Supomo argued that such indi-
vidual protections would go against kekeluargaan and lead to conflict sparked by greed
and self-interest. Hatta countered that without free speech, “the shape of the nation
may become . . . one we cannot agree with.” Hatta supported a state of corporatist