Page 30 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Chapter One

Origins of Media Controls

There is no power holder who dares to use his power if there is not a people
excessively afraid of that power.
—Ignas Kleden, “The Fear of Fighting Fear”

In 1945, sixty-eight of Indonesia’s political leaders met in Jakarta to draft a consti-
tution casting off three centuries of Dutch colonial rule and drawing the archipelago’s
seventeen thousand islands and seventy million inhabitants into a unified nation.
1
Amid contentious debates threatening to divide the delegates over the choice between
secular and Islamic principles, Sukarno [one name], a spellbinding speaker who later
became Indonesia’s first president, rose to address the assembly.
Meticulously attired in a white colonial suit and black Muslim cap, Sukarno pre-
sented a vision bridging the growing rift, offering “a unifying philosophical foun-
dation” they could all accept. “First and foremost,” he asked, with words to defuse
demands for an Islamic state, “are we seeking to establish a nation . . . [that is called]
Free Indonesia, but in reality is only for elevating one person, for giving power to
one wealthy group, for giving power [only] to the aristocracy? Is this our intention?”
Answering this question, he said, “It is clear it is not! . . . We seek to establish a
nation of ‘all for all.’ Not for one person, not for one . . . ethnic group or group that is
wealthy—but ‘all for all.’”
2
In an early condemnation of partisan politics, Sukarno warned that this new
nation should not espouse Western notions of freedom: “If we create freedom . . .
based on philosophies as promoted by American and European nations . . . be assured
that our hearts will be filled with conflict.” He offered instead a vision centered on
indigenous decision-making with Islamic roots, explaining that “the crucial require-
ment for the strength of the Indonesian state is mutual deliberation [ musyawarah ].”
It is this, he said, “that gives life, namely political-economic democracy that can bring
about social justice!”
3
Embedded in these impassioned statements was not only a unifying rejection
of Western democratic precepts but also the espousal of a distinctively Indonesian
form of democracy aspiring to a consensual model of governance. In little more than
a decade, however, these same constitutional principles would help facilitate a shift
from a functioning democracy—with free speech, open elections, and contentious par-
liamentary debate—to an authoritarian state headed by just two powerful leaders,
President Sukarno and his successor, Suharto, for over forty years.
When authoritarian rule began to unravel in Indonesia during the 1997 economic
crisis, President Suharto quickly became the target of the country’s burgeoning demo-
cratic opposition. Once seen as a welcome change from the unstable and increas-
ingly dictatorial rule of his predecessor, Suharto was now, after thirty-two years in
power, the personification of the corruption and authoritarianism that marked his
own regime.