Page 57 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

42 Chapter 2

previous June with the government’s unexpected decision to ban three popular news-
weeklies, Tempo , Editor , and a tabloid named Dë TIK .
The context for these bans was both political opening and an intraelite power
struggle spilling into the media. After four years of relaxed controls, news outlets
overall had become increasingly aggressive in reporting and commentary. But the
boldest were exposing intraelite conflict and publishing exposés based on leaks from
this same elite. The youngest of the three banned publications, the weekly tabloid
Dë TIK , had made its name through interviews with critics from within the military,
revealing growing resentment over Suharto’s promotion of civilians to posts tradi-
tionally reserved for generals. Just before the bans, Dë TIK had published a leak that

implicated the president’s family in the Bapindo banking scandal.
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With this confrontational reporting driving Dë TIK ’s rapid growth, Tempo and Edi-
tor also became increasingly aggressive in their coverage of elite conflict. All three
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began vying for interviews with political insiders critical of the government. They also
reported on cover-ups protecting the regime, presidential succession, and the major
loan scandals of the early 1990s. The relative freedom they had to report such stories
was an encouraging sign that the government was serious in its political opening.
In the spring of 1994, however, a controversy developed between a Suharto favor-
ite, the minister of research and technology, B. J. Habibie, and the finance minis-
ter, Mar’ie Muhammad, over Habibie’s purchase of thirty-nine former East German
warships. The transaction had sparked heated protest from Germany’s parliament
over concerns that Indonesia would use the ships for human rights abuses in outly-
ing provinces. In Jakarta, Muhammad repeatedly rejected Habibie’s requisitions for
expensive renovations, which required millions of dollars above the purchase price.
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Significantly, as Duncan McCargo notes, news of this conflict emerged not from

investigative reporting, but from infighting among the political elite. Tempo broke the
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story, but by June, most of the national media had followed. Reflecting the regime’s
rising displeasure, the information minister, Harmoko, summoned the editors of the
Jakarta press to accuse them of denigrating the nation’s ideological principles and
prohibit any further reporting on the warship purchase. Yet media attention to the
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ministerial infighting continued.
On June 9, Suharto delivered a sharp reprimand during a speech opening the har-
bor for the new fleet. In an indirect reference to the media, he stated angrily that those
“who half-understand the issue, then declare their opinions, have . . . pitted parties
against each other . . . to the point of threatening [the nation’s] stability.” He con-
cluded, “If they cannot be warned, we will have to take steps.” Following this speech,
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rumors began circulating that the government would act on this threat. Angered by
Tempo ’s report, Habibie prepared to file a million-dollar libel lawsuit. But before he
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could follow through, on June 21, the Ministry of Information passed a decree revok-
ing Tempo ’s SIUPP, along with the permits of Editor and Dë TIK .
55
The ministry claimed to be shutting down Editor and Dë TIK for technical viola-
tions. Dë TIK , it said, had become a political tabloid, publishing general news with a
license for crime reporting. But there was no clear explanation for Tempo ’s closure.
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When pushed, Harmoko stated that Tempo ’s reporting had the potential to ignite eth-
nic, religious, racial, or intergroup conflict, citing three articles and a political cartoon
published years earlier.
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The announcement sparked immediate protest. Journalists, students, artists, and
members of the wider public joined employees of the banned weeklies in unprec-
edented demonstrations. One observer described a thousand people, “ignoring their