Page 61 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY
P. 61
46 Chapter 2
a license. Similarly, Eros Djarot and his Dë TIK staff launched a parallel publication
90
using an existing license, but immediately lost it when the Association of Indonesian
Journalists (PWI) withdrew its approval.
91
The Founding of AJI
Reacting to the regime’s apparent success in crushing independent journalism
through this maneuvering, many of the country’s leading journalists broke precedent
in another way, joining forces to take a principled, potentially dangerous stand for
media freedom. A key factor prompting this development was the response of the
PWI—the country’s sole journalists’ association. Rather than defend the journalists
it claimed to represent, the association stated that it “could understand” the govern-
ment’s actions.
A book on the bans explained that it was this final betrayal by the PWI that
gave birth to the new professional association, the Alliance of Independent Journalists
(AJI). While few, if any, had expected the PWI to condemn the Ministry of Informa-
92
tion outright, its response seemed excessively deferential. On July 5, 1994, a del-
egation claiming to represent the country’s journalists delivered a letter of protest
bearing 357 signatures to the PWI’s leadership. In early August, the group launched
93
a campaign called Aksi Tagih Janji (Action to Demand Fulfillment of a Promise) to
hold the PWI to account. Finally, on August 7, more than eighty journalists and
94
Tempo columnists met outside Jakarta in Sirnagalih to plan a course of action for con-
tinued opposition to the bans.
95
The meeting produced a statement, later called the Sirnagalih Declaration, that
condemned “all forms of interference . . . which limited freedom to express opinion[s]
and the rights of citizens to obtain information.” It further rejected the wadah tung-
gal “concept of a sole authorized professional association for journalists.” This last
96
clause, backed by the founding of AJI, was an attack on the PWI’s right to be that asso-
ciation. But it also challenged the New Order’s entire system of corporatist control
through sectoral representation.
The new association “promised to be more in solidarity towards colleagues that
face bans.” It rejected the paternalistic attitude of owners claiming to have a greater
responsibility to protect their employees’ jobs than to protest crackdowns. Their real
97
responsibility, AJI argued, was to take a tougher stance against the bans.
While AJI’s official membership would remain small under Suharto, journalists
now had a professional association with no compromising links to the government.
98
AJI also began publishing an underground newsletter— Independen —that soon claimed
ninety members of parliament as regular subscribers. In the news vacuum left by the
99
closure of Tempo , Dë TIK , and Editor , Independen developed a loyal following for covering
sensitive issues, such as the sizable media interests held by the information minister,
Harmoko, and his relatives.
100
Within a year, however, police raided AJI’s offices, seizing its computers, files, fax
machine, money, and correspondence. On March 17, 1995, plainclothes intelligence
officers arrested three members for violating Article 19(1) of the Basic Press Law,
which prohibited the use of the media for private interests, and criminal statutes out-
lawing defamation of the president, the spread of hatred against the government, and
instigation of animosity among the public.
101
A criminal court sentenced the three AJI members to long jail terms, and the
attorney general banned Independen . The PWI then aided this government crackdown