Page 76 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Suharto’s Fall 61

Trisakti and May Riots
Despite the growth of intercampus networks, nearly all student demonstrations
were confined to campuses until May 1998. Then on May 4, the government raised

the price of fuel by 71 percent, sparking public protests across the country punctuated
by several days of riots in Medan that left six dead. The unrest had begun to spread
57
beyond the universities.
Five days later, President Suharto left for a week-long visit to Egypt. While he was
away, the moment many feared finally arrived. On May 12, 1998, in broad daylight,
military snipers fired on a student demonstration at the elite Trisakti University in
downtown Jakarta, killing four. The next day, journalists at RCTI, which was owned by
Suharto’s son, insisted on airing a “full account” of the event, including a spontaneous
eulogy by the station’s weatherman, Kukuh Sanyoto. Though their act occurred very
close to Suharto’s fall, Sanyoto later noted that a mood of rebellion at the station had
been brewing for many weeks, if not months. The shooting, he explained, “pushed
58
the Indonesian media deeper into the activist mood of the times.” The progression
59
that led to the RCTI staff’s defiance, however, reflected the reciprocal influence of the
movement on the media and the media on the movement.
News of the shootings sent shockwaves through Jakarta. Despite the grow-
ing tension between demonstrators and government, the realization that soldiers,
the “people’s army,” had actually killed unarmed students—particularly at a school
attended by children of top military and civilian officials—stunned many Indonesians.
The fallen students became heroes, and thousands marched behind the weeping rela-
tives who carried their bodies to a Jakarta cemetery. At one of the graves, a student
explained her disbelief: “The army should never have shot them. This is not a war. We
don’t have any weapons. We have only our voices.”
60
Jakarta erupted in violence. On May 13, residents reacting to television images
of “police firing indiscriminately at students” poured into the streets in protest.
61
Elsewhere, less identifiable mobs formed, pulling down lampposts, setting fire to
motor vehicles, and smashing storefront windows, looting as they went. Security
forces in other areas fired tear gas and rubber bullets into crowds and shut down
major highways. These actions prompted eight foreign governments to urge the
Indonesian military to end the crackdown and instead quell the riots with demo-
cratic reforms. Washington sent a military delegation to “warn their Indonesian
62
counterparts in blunt terms that the country could face collapse without restraint
by the armed forces.”
63
Despite this pressure, the rampage continued. From his vantage point on a high-
rise rooftop, one correspondent reported that the city “looked like a vast inferno,”
while “huge columns of smoke rose in every direction, with new fires erupting every
few minutes. Police helicopters circled, while down on the streets, ambulances weaved
their way through crowds of people chanting and clapping at each intersection.” In
64
just two days, hundreds of buildings were burned and over a thousand people died.
To the outside world, it appeared as though Indonesians had spun out of con-
trol. Much of the violence hit Chinese Indonesians, as roving groups—assumed to
be enraged rioters—looted and burned businesses and homes, leaving many victims
inside to die in the flames. Later reports revealed that packs of young men also raped
and mutilated an estimated 150 women and girls of Chinese descent.
65
Western coverage portrayed these events as expression of deep resentments
against ethnic Chinese for the wealth and privilege they had enjoyed under Suharto.
66