Page 73 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

58 Chapter 3

money into political campaigns or private accounts as part of Suharto’s patronage
system and financed the purchase of controlling shares in hundreds of companies for
regime insiders. Again, there was virtually no media coverage of these activities.
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The most flamboyant of the president’s six children, Hutomo Mandala Putera,
or “Tommy,” owned majority shares in a golf course in Ascot, England; one-half
of a share in a $4 million yacht in Darwin, Australia; and 60 percent of the Ital-
ian sports car company Lamborghini. Domestically, Tommy owned controlling
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interests in several businesses, including an airline, the Humpuss conglomerate,
and a company granted exclusive tax concessions to produce a “national car.” The
estimated $200 million of assets owned by Suharto’s middle daughter, Siti “Titiek”
Hediati Harijadi, included interests in a Burmese cement factory and a large rail-
way company in Turkmenistan. Before his father fell from power, the estimated
worth of Suharto’s oldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto, was $450 million. By far the
largest empires were those of Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana,
or “Tutut,” and his second son, Bambang Trihatmojo. Tutut’s estimated worth in
1997, according to one source, was $2 billion—accrued largely from a vast con-
glomerate spanning petrochemicals, banking, and television. The estimated worth
of Bambang was even greater—$3 billion in 1997—with a business consortium,
Bimantara, holding over one hundred subsidiaries with interests including automo-
biles, oil, and telecommunications.
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An investigation by the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations found that Suhar-
to’s family and friends owned or controlled nine million hectares of rain forest, an
area roughly the size of the main Indonesian island of Java. Despite international
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coverage, Jakarta’s above-ground news outlets managed a knowing avoidance of the
spreading corruption, in effect becoming complicit in this ongoing concentration of
power.

The Asian Economic Crisis
Between the 1994 bans and mid-1997, most news coverage of the Suharto regime
steered away from criticism and practiced a local variant of “development journalism”
that gave a sense of continuing growth. Although support for certain opposition lead-
ers, particularly Megawati Sukarnoputri, grew in boldness, there was little coverage to
suggest that a major political storm was brewing beyond vague concern over Suharto’s
failure to designate a successor.
Then, in July 1997, the Asian financial crisis, sparked by the crash of the Thai
baht, prompted a run on Indonesia’s currency, the rupiah. By January 1998, the
rupiah had lost 70 percent of its value and per capita income had dropped from
$1,000 to $400. By mid-March, the banking system, riddled with bad loans, trem-
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bled on the brink of collapse, creating what one observer predicted would “go down
[in history] as the worst financial crisis ever witnessed, certainly since biblical
times.” As other growth indicators sank, inflation rose rapidly, at one point pass-
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ing 200 percent. With the economy’s sharp plunge, nature itself seemed to rise in
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revolt as forest fires produced smog thick enough to crash planes and blacken skies
all the way to Kuala Lumpur. Without warning, Indonesia suddenly faced its worst
drought in fifty years.
The regime attempted to contain the crisis by prohibiting public debate over its
cause or cure, blocking private television stations from broadcasting a November
1997 dialogue between the finance minister and parliament about plans to liquidate