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Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Rechilut תוליכר ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Tet - Halachah 3 ב הכלה - ט ללכ

the Tosafot write there (in the citation beginning with the words “people ינינעב דאמ ליגר אוה הז רבדו .פ"מכ יוצמש הממ )ד(
tend to”) quoting the Rokeach. This concept is brought down as law in
Choshen Mishpat in section #90, paragraph #2, in the commentary of the וליפא( םתוא דירפהל רוביד םוש ליעוי אלש ,ךודישה
Taz and other Authorities. In the Choshen Mishpat section #388, (sub רבע אלד אנווגבו ר"השל םשל ןווכ אל רפסמהש רכינ
paragraph #8) the Hagahah there also implies that if someone had a prior
reputation for carrying out his threats then according to all Authorities we יוצמ ומע ךדתשנש רחאו ,)ןמקלדכו ר"השל רוסיא לע
do not apply the maxim “people tend to exaggerate but do not….” Please רמא ינולפש ךיא וריבחל דחא רפסמש ה"ועב דאמ
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reference there the commentary of the Vilna Gaon annotated to the 11
sub-paragraph, and all of this is obvious. רייוצי אל ולאכ םישנאל ,ךכו ךכ ינולפו ךכו ךכ ךילע
However, on the other hand I am uncertain as to whether or not the .רתיה םוש
requirement of “an established reputation” is applicable here at all.
Maybe we do not use the maxim of “people tend to exaggerate” to say ,טרפל חרכומ ונניאש רבדב יתכראה .'וכו כ"חאו )ה(
that because of it the person would not be obligated to pay, like the cited ןידה אוהו .תויהל ליגרה רבדב רייצל יתיצרש םושמ
case in Gemara Shevu’ot, or to say that the exaggerated threat would not
disqualify the speaker from becoming a witness in Beit Din, as is the law הז לש ועבט תא ריכמ אוהש ךא ,ול עמשי םא וליפא
in Choshen Mishpat, but in any event he is still suspect to carry out the םסרפיו ,ליכר ךלוה עבטב אוהש ותוא ץעיימ אוהש
threat. Therefore in our case, even where there is a remote suspicion (that
he might carry out his threat) one must warn the intended victim, as I ןינעה תא רומגל אלש ותוא ץעי ינולפש לכל רבדה
th
wrote above in the 9 notation quoting the Rosh. Perhaps one can make a רבד עיגהל לכויו ,ינולפו ינולפ םעט תמחמ ינולפ םע
distinction between a generalized suspicion, having heard his threat, (and
in that case one should tell the victim) and the maxim of “people tend to וא ,הלודג תקולחמ אובל לכוי ז"יעו ,ינולפ ינזאל הז
exaggerate.” That maybe it is carrying that suspicion too far (and in that המ לע ,רבדה םעט ותאמ שורדל ודגנכשה ליחתי ןפ
case one may not tell the victim).
,רבכמ דחיב וילע ונמכסהש ןינעה ימע רמוג התא ןיא
And do not challenge what I have said by citing the case of Gedaliah VOL-4
(Yirmiyahu 40:13-16), that Yochanan Ben Koreach told him that Yishmael ולאכ םישנאל ,ךכו ךכ ךילע רמא ינולפ ול בישי אוהו
Ben Netanya wanted to assassinate him. Yochanan was correct and .ןינע םוש םהל רפסל ןיאש הארנ ליכר יכלוה
complied with the law in what he told Gedaliah (even though Yishmael
had no prior reputation as a killer), as the gemara there demonstrates (thus
“proving” that the maxim “people tend to exaggerate” does not exonerate
a person from telling the intended victim about the threat. Do not say this! םייחה רוקמ
First, because in matters of threats to a person’s life we are concerned
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about even the most remote possibility and we do inform the intended ךְרֵטציֶּשׁ יִלבִּמ ,וֹזּה תלעוֹתּה תא בבּסל לוֹכי אוּה )ו( םִא )ד
victim. Second, it was apparent to Yochanan Ben Koreach that Yishmael .וילע רפּסל ןיא ,ערַל וינינִע וינפל תוֹלּגל
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Ben Netanya was serious about carrying out his threat against Gedaliah
Ben Achikam, as the text relates (and so it was necessary to report that
threat to the intended victim). In these cases (where the threat is apparent)
the maxim of “people tend to exaggerate but do not carry out their threat” is םייח םימ ראב
th
not applicable as I will discuss further on in the (following) 13 notation.
ליעל ןייע ולאה םירבדל רוקמ .בבסל לוכי אוה )ו(
(RK9/3/4)-(13) .. realizes from the current circumstances:
.א"יקסב 'י ללכ א"ח ל"נה ללכב 10
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