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2 While outside, Wise was never told by an officer “a police program in which officers gather at a
that he could remain silent or refuse to comply specific place and, following a department-issued
with their requests to empty his pockets. script, briefly speak to drivers without having any
reason to suspect wrongdoing.” The court asserted
3 Some testimony supports Wise’s contention that
that the essence of an unconstitutional checkpoint
an officer removed the lanyard from Wise’s
stop is the forced interaction between an officer
pocket. However, this testimony is vague and is
and a motorist. Moreover, the court found that
contradicted elsewhere in the record.
checkpoint stops are only permissible “if they are
In the trial court, Wise filed a motion to suppress for a narrow particular law enforcement purpose
the evidence the officers obtained after he was directly connected to the use of the roads.”
asked to exit the bus; he claimed this was an According to the court, permissible law
unconstitutional seizure. The Government timely enforcement purposes include removing drunk
filed its response and asserted that the officers had drivers, verifying licenses, and conducting
reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory immigration checkpoints near the border;
detention. The district court held a suppression checkpoints cannot be used “merely to uncover
hearing. Detective Sanders and Detective Sauceda evidence of ordinary crimes.” Under this
testified; Wise did not testify. At a later pre-trial characterization, the district court concluded that
hearing, the district court judge stated that he the bus interdiction constituted an unconstitutional
would suppress “the bus search evidence.” checkpoint. First, the police forced the bus driver
to interact with them. The officers knew that
The Government appeals the district court’s ruling Greyhound mandated that its bus drivers stop at
on a motion to suppress evidence in a case specific locations for loading and unloading
involving the prosecution of a federal offense. The passengers. The Greyhound schedule was publicly
district court properly asserted jurisdiction under available, and the police exploited it. Thus,
18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 “[w]hen the bus driver saw the police waiting, he
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731. could not avoid them. Second, the checkpoint’s
purpose was impermissible because the police
“When examining a district court’s ruling on a
sought “to uncover evidence of ordinary crimes,
motion to suppress, we review questions of law de
like possession of narcotics.”
novo and factual findings for clear error.” “Factual
findings are clearly erroneous only if a review of The district court incorrectly characterized the bus
the record leaves this Court with a ‘definite and interdiction as an unconstitutional checkpoint. The
firm conviction that a mistake has been Supreme Court’s Edmond opinion illustrates the
committed.’” Factual findings that are “influenced court’s error. The checkpoint in Edmond involved
by an incorrect view of the law or an incorrect “roadblocks.” A central feature of the checkpoint
application of the correct legal test” are reviewed was that the police stopped the motorist for
de novo. We view the evidence “in the light most questioning. Drivers could not ignore the officers
favorable to the prevailing party”—here, Wise. or decline to answer questions. Thus the law
enforcement officer forced the motorist to interact
The district court concluded that the Conroe Police
with the authorities.
Department’s decision to stop Greyhound Bus
#6408 constituted an unconstitutional checkpoint The Supreme Court’s other cases discussing
stop. Accordingly, the court suppressed all checkpoints similarly involved government
evidence the police obtained subsequent to the officials initiating the stop. Lidster involved the
stop. The court characterized a checkpoint stop as: police “block[ing] the eastbound lanes of the

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