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luggage. Thus, Wise could challenge a situation of the Fourth Amendment when the police
where the bus driver permitted the police to search questioned him on the bus; (2) he did not
Wise’s luggage. voluntarily consent to the search of his backpack;
and (3) the officers lacked suspicion to justify a
However, it does not follow that Wise has standing
Terry pat down. We disagree.
to challenge the driver’s decision to consent to the
search of the bus’s passenger cabin. Our case law Wise argues that the Conroe Police Department
provides some guidance. Automobile “passengers unreasonably seized him in violation of the
who asserted neither a property nor a possessory Fourth Amendment when they questioned him on
interest in the automobile that was searched . . . the Greyhound. He asserts that he felt restrained
had no legitimate expectation of privacy entitling by police officers while on the bus.
them to the protection of the [F]ourth
Wise identifies a number of factors that
[A]mendment.” United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d
contributed to feeling like he could not leave the
1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991), op. reinstated in part
bus or end the encounter, including: (1) the
on reh’g, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
presence of officers inside and outside the bus; (2)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)). We
the presence of a police canine and marked police
have recognized that a commercial bus passenger
car; (3) the fact that police were conducting a
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
canine drug search near the location they
luggage. However, in that same case we clarified
questioned him; and (4) the officers’ failure to
that passengers have “no reasonable expectation of
advise him that he could refuse to answer their
privacy in the exterior luggage compartment of a
questions or comply with their requests.
commercial bus, and therefore no standing to
contest the actual inspection of that compartment, The Government argues that Wise’s interaction
to which the bus operator consented.” with the police was a consensual encounter—not
a seizure that could implicate the Fourth
Passengers traveling on commercial buses
Amendment. The Government contests Wise’s
resemble automobile passengers who lack any
assertion that the factors mentioned above would
property or possessory interest in the automobile.
make a reasonable person feel that he could not
Like automobile passengers, bus passengers
decline to speak with the police officers or
cannot direct the bus’s route, nor can they exclude
otherwise end the encounter. The Government
other passengers. Bus passengers have no
directs us to Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
possessory interest in a bus’s passenger cabin—
(1991), and United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
except with regard to their personal luggage. Any
194 (2002). Both of these cases shed light on
reasonable expectation of privacy extends only to
when questioning a bus passenger may constitute
that luggage. Passengers have no reasonable
an unconstitutional seizure.
expectation of privacy with respect to the bus’s
cabin. Therefore, Wise lacks standing to challenge The Supreme Court in Bostick evaluated a
the driver’s decision to consent to the search of the situation where uniformed police officers boarded
bus’s interior cabin. a bus, questioned a defendant (absent suspicion),
and then sought the defendant’s consent to search
We may affirm the district court’s ruling on the
his luggage.
motion to suppress “based on any rationale
supported by the record.” Wise identifies three The Court began its analysis by clarifying that “a
potential avenues for affirming the suppression seizure does not occur simply because a police
ruling: (1) he was unreasonably seized in violation officer approaches an individual and asks a few

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