Page 27 - TPA Journal September- October 2017
P. 27
marihuana blunt in the ashtray; he also purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”
informed Trosclair that his wife’s gun was in the
center console. We analyze the constitutionality of traffic stops
under the two-part inquiry of Terry v. Ohio,
Henry consented to a search of his vehicle, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). First we determine whether
which produced two bags of marihuana, a the stop was justified at its inception. If the
digital scale, and a loaded handgun. Henry initial stop was justified, we determine whether
acknowledged that the marihuana and scale the officer’s subsequent actions were
belonged to him. After the officers had reasonably related in scope to the
detained Henry in the back of their police car, circumstances that justified the stop of the
Henry’s wife arrived. She denied ownership of vehicle in the first place. For a traffic stop to be
anything in the car, including the gun, and justified at its inception, an officer must have
consented to a search of her and Henry’s an objectively reasonable suspicion that some
house, where officers discovered additional sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation,
bags of marihuana, a bag of cocaine, and drug occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping
paraphernalia. the vehicle.
Henry was indicted for possession of a firearm Reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistake of
by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) law or fact if the mistake is objectively
and for possession of marihuana in violation of reasonable.
21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He moved to suppress
evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop, Henry contends that the initial stop was not
but the court denied the motion, concluding justified. He does not contest the district
that the stop was not unreasonable, even if court’s finding that his license-plate frame
based on a mistake of law. After a bench trial, obstructed the view of the expiration date on
the court convicted Henry on both counts. his registration sticker. Instead, he asserts that
Section 32:53(A)(3) does not cover obstructed
Henry contends that the court erred in denying registration stickers. He maintains that the
his motion to suppress. He maintains that the statute, which provides that “[e]very
traffic stop was unlawful because Freeman and permanent registration license plate . . . shall
Trosclair did not have reasonable suspicion be maintained free from foreign materials and
that he had engaged in any illegal activity. The in a condition to be clearly legible,” requires
officers averred that they believed Henry’s only that the letters and numbers on the plate
obstructed registration sticker violated itself be clearly legible. The government
Louisiana Statutes Annotated § 32:53(A)(3), disagrees, asserting that Section 32:53
which provides that “[e]very permanent prohibits obstruction of attached registration
registration license plate . . . shall be stickers by a license-plate frame, which the
maintained free from foreign materials and in a government categorizes as a “foreign
condition to be clearly legible.” Henry material.”
counters that Section 32:53 does not apply to
obstructed registration stickers and that the (ed. Note: consider this analysis under Texas
officers’ interpretation of the statute was Law, Transp. Code Section 502.475. See,
unreasonable. License plate frame on defendant’s vehicle,
“Traffic stops are deemed seizures for the which covered name of state that issued plate,
Sept./Oct. 2017 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • 866-997-8282 21
