Page 28 - TPA Journal September- October 2017

violated Texas statute prohibiting covering that
obscured letters on license plate, and thus,
officers had probable cause to stop defendant’s
vehicle for violation of the statute. U.S. v.
Contreras-Trevino, C.A.5 2006, 448 F.3d 821,
certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 447, 549 U.S. 981,
166 L.Ed.2d 318.))
We need not opine on the proper
interpretation of Section 32:53, because
Louisiana caselaw establishes that the officers’
interpretation, even if mistaken, was
objectively reasonable. In State v. Pena, the
court considered whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based
on, among other things, improper display of a
license plate. “The photographs introduced
into evidence revealed that although the
numbers and letters on the license plate were
clearly visible, the top and bottom portions of
the plate were partially obscured by a license
plate frame.” After citing Louisiana Statutes
Annotated 47:507(B), the predecessor to
Section 32:53(A)(3),7 the court concluded that
the officer “had reasonable suspicion that a
traffic violation had occurred” because, in part,
“the photographs introduced into evidence
revealed that the license plate was partially
obscured . . . .” Given Pena, Freeman and
Trosclair’s belief that Section 32:53(A)(3)
prohibited an obscured registration sticker was
objectively reasonable. Pena directly rejects
Henry’s position that Section 32:53 applies
only to the lettering and numbering on the
plate itself. To the contrary, the court held that
a license-plate frame that obscured part of the
plate violated the statute, even though the
lettering and numbering on the plate was
“clearly visible.” Id. Though Pena does not
specifically address obscured registration
stickers, its broad construction of the statute
can reasonably be construed to apply to them.
In sum, we take no position on the correct
22 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • 866-997-8282
interpretation of Section 32:53(A)(3). We
conclude only that, given Pena, the officers’
belief that Henry’s obstructed registration
sticker violated Section 32:53, even if
mistaken, was objectively reasonable. Thus,
they had reasonable suspicion, which justified
the traffic stop.
The judgments of conviction are AFFIRMED.
U.S. v. Henry, 5th Cir., No. 16-30731, April
10th, 2017.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE – CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION – SEARCH WARRANT
Jarman conditionally pleaded guilty to the
receipt and attempted receipt of child
pornography.
He challenges the district court’s denial of both
his motion to suppress evidence obtained in
the search of his home and his motion for
reconsideration. He contends that the district
court erred because: (1) it should not have
applied the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule; (2) the search-warrant
affidavit for his home does not establish
probable cause; and (3) the Government’s
delay in searching the computers seized from
his home violated the Fourth Amendment and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.
Because the good faith exception applies and
the Government’s post-seizure delay did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, we AFFIRM.
The FBI began investigating Jarman when
Jason Collins, the co-owner of a computer
repair store, called FBI Special Agent (“SA”)
Larry Jones in November 2007. Collins told SA
Jones that he suspected one of his customers
had child pornography on his hard drive. He
said that the customer had purchased a new
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