Page 47 - TPA Journal January February 2022

the video recording from the agent’s body camera Government. And where, as here, “a district court’s
as an exhibit. After the suppression hearing, Nelson denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral
filed a supplemental motion, arguing for the first testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is
time that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment particularly strong because the judge had the
rights and therefore the evidence derived from the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
stop should be suppressed. The magistrate judge witnesses.” A district court’s ruling to deny a
recommended denying Nelson’s motion. Nelson suppression motion should be upheld “if there is any
filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report, but reasonable view of the evidence to support it.”
the district court adopted the report in full and
denied Nelson’s motion to suppress. Nelson Nelson first argues that the district court erred in
subsequently pleaded guilty to conspiracy to denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained
possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or from the stop of his vehicle, contending the stop was
more of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, unconstitutional because the BPAs lacked
Nelson reserved the right to appeal the denial of his reasonable suspicion to make it. A Border Patrol
suppression motion and was sentenced to three agent on roving patrol “is justified in stopping a
years in prison with three years of supervised vehicle if he reasonably suspects, based on specific
release. articulable facts together with rational inferences
from the facts, that the vehicle might be engaged in
On appeal, Nelson argues that the district court illegal activity.” In determining whether reasonable
erred by denying his suppression motion for three suspicion exists, we often consider the common
reasons. First, Nelson argues that the BPAs lacked sense factors set forth in United States v. Brignoni-
the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a Ponce: (1) proximity to the border; (2)
roving-patrol stop, rendering all evidence obtained characteristics of the area; (3) usual traffic patterns
from the stop inadmissible. Second, Nelson argues on a particular road; (4) agent’s previous experience
that he was in custodial interrogation when in detecting illegal activity; (5) behavior of the
questioned by Agent Stauffiger, making his driver; (6) particular aspects or characteristics of the
statements inadmissible, because he was not given vehicle; (7) information about recent illegal
Miranda warnings. Finally, Nelson argues that trafficking in aliens or narcotics in the area; and (8)
Border Patrol agents lack authority to conduct the number, appearance, and behavior of the
investigative stops solely related to non- passengers. “[E]ach case must be examined based
immigration offenses—an argument he concedes is on he totality of the circumstances known to the
foreclosed under this Court’s precedent. agents at the time of the stop and their experience in
evaluating such circumstances.”
When considering the denial of a motion to
suppress, this Court reviews factual findings for The Government argues, and we agree, that the
clear error and legal conclusions, including whether totality of the circumstances here support a finding
an officer had reasonable suspicion to support a that Agent Stauffiger had reasonable suspicion to
stop and whether Miranda’s guarantees have been justify stopping Nelson’s vehicle. First, our Court
impermissibly denied, de novo. Evidence is has recognized that proximity to the border is “a
viewed in the light most favorable to the party that paramount factor in determining reasonable
prevailed in the district court—in this case, the suspicion.” While there is no bright line test with

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