Page 40 - TPA Journal May June 2025

from the patrol vehicle and placed in an interview ‘custodial interrogation.’”
room at OPD. Kapets entered the room and began A person is “‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes
questioning Fernandez after confirming that he when placed under formal arrest or when a rea-
had been Mirandized. As relevant here, Kapets sonable person in the suspect’s position would
asked Fernandez how long he had used cocaine have understood the situation to constitute a
for. Fernandez explained that he had used it spo- restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
radically recently, but he maintained that he was which the law associates with formal arrest.” To
not an addict. use an in-custody statement against the defendant,
The district court granted in part and denied in part the government must establish that he was warned
Fernandez’s motion to suppress this evidence. of his right to remain silent and his right to consult
Specifically, it ruled admissible those statements with an attorney. A suspect in custody may waive
that Fernandez made before being handcuffed and the effectuation of his Miranda rights if the state-
those he made after being Mirandized. But it ment was made “voluntarily, knowingly and intel-
ordered suppressed those statements that ligently.”
Fernandez made while handcuffed through the Fernandez argues that the district court erroneous-
time he received his Miranda warnings. Put dif- ly ruled that his post-Miranda statements were
ferently, the district court suppressed the state- admissible because the police used a two-step,
ments Fernandez made between 1:48 p.m. and “question first” strategy forbidden under Missouri
2:00 p.m. v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). He also chal-
Fernandez subsequently waived his right to a jury lenges the district court’s finding that the officers’
trial, and the parties agreed to a stipulated set of failure to Mirandize him resulted from “innocent
facts. The joint stipulation recognized that neglect.” Allegedly, the officers’ tactics were
Fernandez reserved his right to appeal the sup- instead “driven solely by their desire to do an end
pression ruling. At a bench trial, the district court run around Miranda and to set [him] up for a fed-
found Fernandez guilty as charged and later sen- eral criminal prosecution.” The government coun-
tenced him to a within-guidelines term of 10 ters that Fernandez’s post-Miranda statements
months of imprisonment and three years of super- were admissible because they were voluntary and
vised release. Fernandez timely appealed. because the officers did not deliberately try to cir-
“When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress cumvent Miranda. It reasons that “the officers
evidence, this [c]ourt reviews factual findings for were dealing with an emergency situation in their
clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of own parking lot” and trying “to assess how best to
law enforcement action de novo.” The evidence proceed.” It further argues that Fernandez’s post-
presented at a suppression hearing is viewed “in Miranda statements were not coerced because
the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Kapets “never directly confronted [Fernandez]
This court defers to the district court’s factual with his pre-warning statements,” and Fernandez
findings unless there is “a definite and firm con- understood his right not to incriminate himself.
viction that a mistake has been committed.”
Seibert “requires the suppression of a post-warn-
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person ing statement only where a deliberate two-step
shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be strategy is used and no curative measures are
a witness against himself.” “the prosecution may taken.” In other words, officers cannot employ
not use statements stemming from custodial inter- “the two-step interrogation technique . . . in a cal-
rogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates culated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”
the use of procedural safeguards effective to “If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used,
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” postwarning statements that are related to the sub-
“Miranda warnings must be administered prior to stance of prewarning statements must be excluded

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