Page 34 - TPA Journal November December 2023

ments for bribery of a local official is below the did not think one was required), and its definition
fifteen-years’ imprisonment for federal-official of “corruptly” said nothing about a formal this-
bribery, but higher than the two-years’ imprison- for-that. And if a very capable and experienced
ment for illegal gratuities; and Congress’s interest district judge did not believe that the language of
in federal officials taking bribes is higher than its § 666 required a quid pro quo, it is hardly clear
interest in local officials (with some connection to that lay jurors would have understood that based
federal funds) doing the same. Thus, all signs on the text alone. The lack of such a quid pro quo
point toward the sensible conclusion that § 666 is instruction rendered the jury instructions unclear,
more like § 201(b), and that Congress meant for § as the jurors were permitted to convict on an ille-
666 to be similarly limited. For these reasons, we gal- gratuity theory that does not exist in § 666.
conclude that § 666 applies only to quid pro quo That is enough to justify vacating Hamilton’s con-
bribery. That is enough to decide this case and we viction.
go no further.
Section 666 criminalizes only a quid pro quo, not
Because § 666 requires a quo, there is the problem mere gratuities. The district court’s instruction
with the district court’s instructions to the jury. In allowed the jury to convict based on mere gratu-
its view, § 666 did “not require quid pro quo ities. For these reasons, we VACATE Hamilton’s
bribery,” and because the statute does not explicit- convictions and REMAND for proceedings con-
ly distinguish between bribery and mere gratuities, sistent with this opinion.
the court did not instruct the jury that a quid pro th
quo was required. Hamilton properly objected to U.S. v. Hamilton, 5 Cir., No. 21-11157, Aug.
rd
this at that time, arguing that such an instruction 23 , 2023.
was necessary under § 666(a). The government
now contends that, even if quid pro quo is
required, the court’s instruction was sufficient EVIDENCE – identification (proper penalty
because it tracked the language of the statute. group) of drugs underlying conviction.
While the government is correct that a statute-
tracking instruction is often enough, the instruc- Habeas Corpus action. Opinion unreported.
tion must also “clearly instruct[] jurors as to the
principles of law applicable to the factual issues Applicant was convicted of possession of
confronting them.” The government cites cocaine, a penalty group one substance, in the
Whitfield for the proposition that a jury instruc- amount of less than one gram, and was sentenced
to 180 days in state jail. Applicant filed this
tion is fine, even without quid pro quo language, if
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the
it “sufficiently conveyed the essential idea of give-
and-take.” But in Whitfield, there was no concern county of conviction, and the district clerk for-
about whether a payment was a gratuity or a warded it to this Court.
bribe—i.e., there was no debate about whether the
Applicant contends that his plea was
payor got something in return; the only debate was
involuntary because after his conviction, the sub-
about whether, when the payment was made, the stance was tested and determined to be A-PVP, a
payor and local official had in mind what the quo penalty group two controlled substance.
would be. Here, the government proceeded on a Applicant was unaware of the 2013 lab report
gratuity theory and only now says that it could
until the District Attorney sent him a letter in
have won either way.
2021. He contends he is entitled to relief based
on a due process violation or an involuntary plea
The district court gave no instruction as to the
meaning of “intent to influence or reward,” or that claim because he did not know when he entered
it requires a quid pro quo (because, of course, it his guilty plea and was convicted that he did not

30 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • (512) 458-3140 Texas Police Journal