Page 40 - TPA Journal November December 2023
P. 40

for causation that criminal law addresses through    Justin’s act was a concurrent cause of her failure to
        culpability.                                         provide medical care for J.D.9 Section 22.04(a) is
                                                             a “result of conduct” offense; where the allegation
        Thus, evidence contesting such foreseeability, as    is a failure to provide medical care, the result must
        in  Williams, is evidence refuting mens rea.         flow from that conduct.  As we noted in Jefferson,
        Foreseeability in the instant case was proven by     we do not require jury unanimity regarding the
        virtue of the jury’s finding of recklessness, and    conduct constituting the “means” in injury to a
        the sufficiency of the evidence on that point, hav-  child cases under § 22.04 where the injury is nev-
        ing been upheld by the court of appeals, is not      ertheless caused by such act or omission. Jefferson
        before us.  When the State proved the necessary      v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311–12 (Tex. Crim. App.
        mens rea, it likewise proved “proximate causa-       2006). Both means alleged, however, must satisfy
        tion” as that term is used in the civil counterpart  the “but-for” causal connection with the result.
        to criminal causation.
                                                             Here, the State alleged that both Appellant’s fail-
        Further, had Williams alleged concurrent causa-      ure to prevent injury and failure to provide med-
        tion principles absolved her of liability by virtue  ical care caused the child’s injuries. Both must
        of her boyfriend’s simultaneous acts in inadver-     have been a “but-for” cause of the resulting harm,
        tently burning the home, this Court would be         and both are analyzed separately for purposes of
        faced with an identical dilemma. Thus, the confu-    concurrent causation. The fact Justin injured the
        sion confronted in this case extends not only to     child at the same time Appellant failed to prevent
        omission offenses but likewise appears with          the injury does nothing to controvert the causal
        respect to a charge involving an affirmative act.    relationship between  Appellant’s failure to pro-
        The State’s contention that the conflict in this case  vide medical care and the injury.
        is confined to omission cases is therefore
        unfounded. Our conclusion likewise comports          Further, because injury-to-a-child offenses are
        with the reasoning of the  American Law              result-oriented, § 22.04 requires the State to prove
        Institute’s Model Penal Code, on which the Texas     not only that an individual failed to provide rea-
        Penal Code is based. Under the Model Penal           sonable medical care, but that doing so caused a
        Code, defendants may remain independently            separate injury, even if the separate injury was a
        liable for their harmful omissions even where the    worsening of the child’s condition.  Therefore, any
        injury occurs vis-à-vis a third party.               causal dispute regarding the source of J.D.’s initial
                                                             injury necessarily would not apply to the subse-
        Finally, a concurrent causation jury instruction     quent failure to provide reasonable medical care.
        would only serve to confuse the jury. Trusting a     The jury charge correctly required the jury to find
        jury to reconcile factual causation and concurrent   a causal relationship between both proposed
        causation in a case where the evidence does not      means and the resulting, separate injuries.
        support concurrent causes would improperly ask
        the jury the same questions the Eleventh Court of    One concurrent cause present in this case which
        Appeals has apparently designated “too difficult     Appellant could have raised but did not, centers on
        for lawyers or even for philosophers.”               Justin’s failure to provide medical care following
                                                             the initial injury.  Assuming such a concurrent
        As a result, we find concurrent causation inap-      omission satisfies the first prong of our test under
        plicable to  Appellant’s failure to prevent J.D.’s   § 6.04(a), it fails the second requirement which
        injury, as Appellant’s arguments contest culpabil-   would require Appellant to show that the concur-
        ity, rather than allege concurrent causes.           rent omission was clearly sufficient alone to cause
                                                             the additional injury, while hers was clearly insuf-
        Likewise,  Appellant fails to demonstrate that




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