Page 48 - January February 2020 TPJ

the bus; he claimed this was an unconstitutional seizure. checkpoint. First, the police forced the bus driver to
The Government timely filed its response and asserted interact with them. The officers knew that Greyhound
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to perform an mandated that its bus drivers stop at specific locations
investigatory detention. The district court held a for loading and unloading passengers. The Greyhound
suppression hearing. Detective Sanders and Detective schedule was publicly available, and the police
Sauceda testified; Wise did not testify. At a later pre- exploited it. Thus, “[w]hen the bus driver saw the police
trial hearing, the district court judge stated that he would waiting, he could not avoid them. Second, the
suppress “the bus search evidence.” checkpoint’s purpose was impermissible because the
police sought “to uncover evidence of ordinary crimes,
The Government appeals the district court’s ruling on a like possession of narcotics.”
motion to suppress evidence in a case involving the
prosecution of a federal offense. The district court The district court incorrectly characterized the bus
properly asserted jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. interdiction as an unconstitutional checkpoint. The
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 Supreme Court’s Edmond opinion illustrates the court’s
U.S.C. § 3731. error. The checkpoint in Edmond involved
“roadblocks.” A central feature of the checkpoint was
“When examining a district court’s ruling on a motion that the police stopped the motorist for questioning.
to suppress, we review questions of law de novo and Drivers could not ignore the officers or decline to
factual findings for clear error.” “Factual findings are answer questions. Thus the law enforcement officer
clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves forced the motorist to interact with the authorities.
this Court with a ‘definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Factual findings that are The Supreme Court’s other cases discussing
“influenced by an incorrect view of the law or an checkpoints similarly involved government officials
incorrect application of the correct legal test” are initiating the stop. Lidster involved the police
reviewed de novo. We view the evidence “in the light “block[ing] the eastbound lanes of the highway,”
most favorable to the prevailing party”—here, Wise. “forc[ing] traffic to slow down,” and—when each
vehicle passed through the checkpoint—“stop[ping]
The district court concluded that the Conroe Police [the vehicle] for 10 to 15 seconds.” Illinois v. Lidster,
Department’s decision to stop Greyhound Bus #6408 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004). Sitz involved a situation
constituted an unconstitutional checkpoint stop. where: “[a]ll vehicles passing through a checkpoint
Accordingly, the court suppressed all evidence the would be stopped [by the police] and their drivers
police obtained subsequent to the stop. The court briefly examined for signs of intoxication.” Sitz, 496
characterized a checkpoint stop as: “a police program U.S. at 447. And Martinez–Fuerte involved a permanent
in which officers gather at a specific place and, immigration checkpoint stationed by law enforcement
following a department-issued script, briefly speak to officers that brought traffic “to a virtual, if not a
drivers without having any reason to suspect complete, halt.” United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428
wrongdoing.” The court asserted that the essence of an U.S. 543, 546 (1976) (footnote omitted). This line of
unconstitutional checkpoint stop is the forced checkpoint cases—and the apparent concern with the
interaction between an officer and a motorist. Moreover, government initiating the stop and forcing motorists to
the court found that checkpoint stops are only interact—stems from an essential principle recognized
permissible “if they are for a narrow particular law in Terry: the essence of an unconstitutional seizure is
enforcement purpose directly connected to the use of that a government official has restrained a citizen’s
the roads.” According to the court, permissible law liberty. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)
enforcement purposes include removing drunk drivers, (“Only when [an] officer, by means of physical force or
verifying licenses, and conducting immigration show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty
checkpoints near the border; checkpoints cannot be used of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
“merely to uncover evidence of ordinary crimes.” occurred.”).
Under this characterization, the district court concluded
that the bus interdiction constituted an unconstitutional Here, the Conroe Police Department did not establish

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