Page 55 - July August 2019 TPA Journal
P. 55
Ann. art. 14.01(b) (“A peace officer may arrest direct evidence about Officer Quinn’s
an offender without a warrant for any offense observations of Appellee’s intoxication or what, if
committed in his presence or within his view.”). anything, the testifying officers, Guerrero and
The State presented the testimony of Officers Ramirez, told Quinn about their own
Guerrero and Ramirez that they saw facts observations of Appellee’s intoxication. We
constituting the offense of public intoxication: vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
that Appellee was in a public place, that Appellee remanded to that court because probable cause
was intoxicated, and that Appellee posed a danger can be shown by circumstantial as well as direct
to himself or others. evidence, and a finding of probable cause did not
necessarily depend on direct evidence about
Toward the end of the State’s closing argument, Officer Quinn’s observations or what the
the trial court interrupted, disagreeing with the testifying officers told him about their
State’s reference to the “arresting officers.”2 observations of Appellee’s intoxication.
Next, during Appellee’s closing argument,
counsel continued on that front and began by The trial court, accordingly, made those
focusing on the fact that Officer Quinn, who supplemental findings, and it concluded, again,
physically arrested Appellee, did not testify. that Officer Quinn did not have probable cause to
Defense counsel argued that Appellee’s right to arrest Appellee for public intoxication. The court
confront his accusers was being violated. of appeals affirmed. The State filed another
Defense counsel also contended that the State petition for discretionary review, and we granted
failed to show that Appellee was a danger to review on both grounds:
himself or others.
As the State was about to begin its rebuttal 1. The Court of Appeals erroneously decided an
argument, the trial court asked whether Officer important question of state law in a way that
Quinn would testify at trial. The trial court also conflicts with the applicable decisions of the
asked the State to again confirm that only Officer Court of Criminal Appeals, by finding that the
Quinn arrested Appellee. knowledge of supporting officers cannot be used
to establish probable cause.
After closing arguments, the trial court quoted
from article 14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal 2. The Court of Appeals failed to conduct the
Procedure; informed the parties that it looked at required de novo review of whether the evidence
cases discussing article 14.01(b);3 and concluded known to Officer Quinn was sufficient to
that article 14.01(b) appeared to be limited to the establish probable cause and that failure
officer who made the arrest, Officer Quinn. constitutes a departure from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings that calls for
Because the trial court believed there was no an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’
evidence showing whether Officer Quinn had power of supervision.
knowledge of sufficient facts to constitute
probable cause, the trial court granted Appellee’s We conclude that consideration of the first
motion to suppress. ground resolves the probable cause question.
Under the facts of this case, Officer Quinn’s
On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals knowledge is not determinative. Whatever his
affirmed the trial court’s ruling due to a lack of knowledge of the facts may have been, that
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