Page 56 - July August 2019 TPA Journal

information, in combination with the knowledge of an arrest or search by any of the officers
of Officers Guerrero and Ramirez, showed involved is to be considered in determining
probable cause to arrest Appellee for public whether there was sufficient probable cause
intoxication. In support of the first ground for therefor.” In other words, under this
review, the State argues that the “collective “collective knowledge” doctrine, when several
knowledge” doctrine applies in this case, and the officers are cooperating, their cumulative
knowledge of both Officers Guerrero and information may be considered in assessing
Ramirez should be added to the knowledge of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Officer Quinn (which is unknown). The State [emphasis by ed.] Appellee argues that
contends that the sum total of the knowledge of communication is key to the collective
all three officers would add up to probable cause, knowledge doctrine, and, because there is no
and the arrest should be upheld. Appellee’s initial evidence that either Officer Guerrero or Officer
response is that the applicability of the collective Ramirez communicated with Officer Quinn
knowledge doctrine is not before the Court, before the arrest, the doctrine cannot be applied
because it was not explicitly part of our prior in this case. In support of this argument, Appellee
opinion remanding this matter to the court of points out the fact that the collective knowledge
appeals. Appellee points out that our opinion on cases cited by the State all involved some level of
first submission faulted the lower courts for communication. Specifically, Appellee notes that
failing to consider whether circumstantial in Pyles v. State, the officer who made the
evidence of Officer Quinn’s knowledge could warrantless arrest was aware that a sheriff’s
amount to probable cause, and we remanded “for deputy had been murdered in the area where he
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of found the defendant. Appellee also quotes
law consistent with this opinion.” While it is true United States v. Ortiz, in which the Fifth Circuit
that our opinion, remanding this case to the court Court of Appeals stated: “‘Under the collective
of appeals, did not direct that court to address the knowledge doctrine, it is not necessary for the
collective knowledge issue, the State nevertheless arresting officer to know all of the facts
raised it as an issue on remand, and the court of amounting to probable cause, as long as there is
appeals considered and rejected the State’s some degree of communication between the
argument. Additionally, in its current petition for arresting officer and an officer who has
discretionary review, the State’s argument in knowledge of all the necessary facts.’” United
favor of review on the first ground asserted that States v. Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2015)
the court of appeals erred by failing to take into (quoting United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526,
account the collective knowledge doctrine. That 530 (5th Cir. 2007)).
first ground was granted review by this Court,
and, even though it was not part of our prior The State argues that communication is not a
opinion remanding this case, the issue has been necessary requirement of the collective
addressed by the court of appeals, is before us knowledge doctrine. Instead, communication
now, and should be addressed. serves to prove cooperation between the officers,
which is the true cornerstone of the doctrine. If
In Woodward v. State, we held “that when there cooperation is proven in some other way, the
has been some cooperation between law collective knowledge doctrine can be applied
enforcement agencies or between members of the without affirmative evidence showing
same agency, the sum of the information known communication. Appellee criticizes this approach
to the cooperating agencies or officers at the time as endorsing a “hive thinking” standard.

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