Page 38 - TPA Journal March April 2024
P. 38

essarily focus our attention on the literal text of the   (1) shall drive as nearly as practical
        statute in question and attempt to discern the fair,      entirely within a single lane; and
        objective meaning of the text at the time of its
        enactment.  We follow this principle because (1)          (2) may not move from the lane unless
        the text of the statute is the law; (2) the text is the   that movement can be made safely.
        only definitive evidence of what the legislators     Considering the statute as a whole, the statute is
        had in mind when the statute was enacted into law;
                                                             clear and unambiguous. “Nearly” means “almost
        and (3) the Legislature is constitutionally entitled  but not quite.”  “Practical” as it is used in the
        to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow
                                                             statute simply means “having or displaying good
        the specific text that was adopted.  Our duty is to  judgment: SENSIBLE.”  “Safely” means “free
        try to interpret the work of our Legislature as best
                                                             from harm or risk,” “secure from threat of danger,
        we can to fully effectuate the goals they set out.   harm, or loss,” or “affording safety or security
        Legislative intent isn’t the law, but discerning leg-
                                                             from danger, risk, or difficulty.”  No one disputes
        islative intent isn’t the end goal, either.  The end  that we should adopt the common understanding
        goal is interpreting the text of the statute.  In inter-
                                                             of these applicable terms.  The dispute, instead,
        preting the text of the statute, we must presume     centers around whether the two statutory subsec-
        that every word in a statute has been used for a
                                                             tions create two different offenses or one. A plain
        purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and      reading of the statute reveals that a motorist does
        sentence should be given effect if reasonably pos-
                                                             not commit an offense any time a tire touches or
        s         i        b         l        e         .    crosses a clearly marked lane. It is only when the
         We do not focus solely upon a discrete provision;
                                                             failure to stay “as nearly as practical” entirely with
        we look at other statutory provisions as well to     a single lane becomes unsafe that a motorist vio-
        harmonize text and avoid conflicts.  “Time-hon-
                                                             lates the statute. Subsection (a)(1) does not require
        ored canons of interpretation, both semantic and     a motorist to stay entirely within a single lane; it
        contextual, can aid interpretation, provided the
                                                             only requires that a motorist remain entirely with-
        canons esteem textual interpretation.”
                                                             in a single marked lane “as nearly as practical.” In
        Moreover, we read words and phrases in context       other words, a motorist is not actually required to
        and construe them according to rules of grammar.     maintain a single marked lane under subsection
        When a particular term is not legislatively defined  (a)(1). He or she must “almost, but not quite” stay
        but has acquired a technical meaning, we construe    within the lane. This section is designed to protect
        that term in its technical sense.  When it has not,  motorists from being accused of a crime due to an
        we construe that term according to common            inability to stay entirely within a single marked
        u         s        a         g         e        .    lane at all times.  Subsection (a)(2), on the other
         We may consult standard or legal dictionaries to    hand, prohibits any movement from the lane
        determine the meaning of undefined terms.            unless that movement can be made safely. And
                                                             while the phrase “move from the lane” can include
        At the heart of this case is the construction of the  a complete lane change, the scope of the statute is
        statute that gives rise to the offense colloquially  not textually limited to situations in which the dri-
        referred to as “failure to maintain a single lane.”  ver moves “entirely” from the lane because the
        Texas  Transportation Code Section 545.060(a),       legislature did not modify the word “move” with
        titled “Driving on Roadway Laned for  Traffic,”      the word “entirely.” Considered in connection
        gives rise to this traffic offense. Section          with subsection (a)(1), any unsafe weaving out of
        545.060(a) provides in relevant part:                the lane violates the statute but weaving out of the
                                                             lane without creating a safety risk does not violate
              (a) An operator on a roadway divided           the statute because incidental weaving is still stay-
              into two or more clearly marked lanes          ing “as nearly as practical” entirely within the sin-
              for traffic:



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